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The origins of this book lie in an invitation from Professor John Wanna to those
responsible for the various streams of papers presented at the GOVNET
Conference held at The Australian National University in December 2006, to
submit sets of papers for consideration for publication as an ANU E Press
monograph. It was felt that several of the papers presented in the ‘Rethinking
Regulation’ stream, combined with a number of papers presented at other
conferences and two specially commissioned chapters, provided valuable insights
into the ‘waves’ of regulatory reform that Australia has experienced over the
last 30 years, especially in regard to the successive attempts to improve the
quality of the processes by which regulation is made and amended by government
in conjunction with various stakeholders and interests. The result was this book,
offering a wide range of views on several aspects of regulatory reform, prepared
by authors who include academics, senior public servants and consultants. The
book is an important contribution as it both describes and explains the reasons
for many of the successes and failures of past reforms to regulation making
processes at a time when Australia has commenced a third wave of reform, in
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The GOVNET conference stream from which the chapters in this volume were
drawn was titled ‘Rethinking Regulation’. ‘Rethinking’ was what the Regulation
Taskforce felt was called for if the causes, not just consequences, of the many
poor regulations we observed were to be addressed. That, of course, is easier
said than done, as some of the chapters in this volume attest.
The challenge facing aspiring reformers in this area reflects the reality, as one
senior public servant put it, that ’no regulation is an orphan‘. There are persistent
demands on governments to ’do something‘ about issues of importance to
particular groups. Such demands have both intensified and widened as our
society has become more affluent and knowledgeable. That, of course, is
democracy at work. It is to be expected. The resulting problems have more to
do with how governments have responded to such claims through regulations,
and how those regulations have been administered.
The Taskforce found not only an escalation in the stock of regulations, but also
various deficiencies in their quality. Many regulations were found to be (among
other things) overly prescriptive, poorly targeted, duplicative, mutually
inconsistent, excessive in their coverage of firms and unduly onerous in the
reporting and other obligations on the firms affected. Unintended consequences
abounded.
How did this come about? Our report documents the reasons in clinical detail
and more analysis can be found in this volume. But all the key ingredients can
be illustrated in the following hypothetical scenario adapted from a speech I
gave in 2006. Since no-one has subsequently contradicted me, I will assume that
others too see it as a reasonable depiction of our regulatory processes at work.
A hypothetical regulation in the ‘making’
A child is critically injured following a mishap with a skipping rope. On a slow
news day, the story gets a run in one of the tabloids. A caller to the local radio
talk show expresses alarm that ‘these potentially lethal products’ are still being
sold. The compere, a high profile figure, expresses concern: ’Government inaction
is putting our kids at risk!’ The Minister is commanded to appear on his show.
In the face of some torrid questioning and innuendo, she promises that her
government will take firm action to eliminate the threat posed by skipping ropes.
Next day, the talk-back king pursues a new story (about bad language in public
places). The Minister, however, feels obliged to instruct her department to take
steps to put the government’s new skipping rope policy into effect.
The department gets to it. Following a couple of conversations with the Minister’s
office, a proposal to ban skipping ropes is drafted for cabinet consideration.
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However, a few days before cabinet is due to meet, someone recalls that any
new regulation that may impose costs on business must have had a Regulation
Impact Statement prepared, demonstrating the superiority of the preferred course
of action. Panic stations!
An RIS justifying the ban is hurriedly put together by a junior departmental
officer and submitted to the government’s Regulation Unit, whose job it is to
assist agencies and monitor their compliance with the government’s RIS
requirements. The Unit finds that the draft is inadequate on the key matters of
demonstrating that any new government action is warranted and that a ban in
any case would be the best option. [Consternation!]
A second draft, responding to some of the Unit’s concerns, is quickly assembled
and re-submitted. On a less significant matter, or with a less extreme regulatory
option (and perhaps with more time) the revised RIS may have been helped over
the line. As it is, the Unit is obliged to deny approval a second time.
Time is now up, however, and the submission proceeds to cabinet. A Coordination
Comment from the Regulation Unit notes that the RIS was not adequate. The
Minister (who has not read the RIS) concludes that the Unit is being
obstructionist. Cabinet, aware of the origins of the new skipping rope policy —
the little girl, the public outcry — agrees to the Minister’s proposed ban. The
Treasurer/Finance Minister has been briefed by his department about the adverse
efficiency implications, but takes comfort from the fact that there are at least no
budgetary implications. The Minister responsible for Industry knows that there
are no local manufacturers of skipping ropes left — the last turned to importing
when the tariff dropped below 15 per cent — so she too is comfortable.
I could conclude my hypothetical scenario there, as I think you get my drift.
But this would omit the implementation phase, which as business groups told
the Taskforce, can be as problematic as regulation-making itself in contributing
to bad outcomes. So I’ll go further. In this contrived example, cabinet could
have decided that a ‘black letter’ ban on skipping ropes was going too far. (Maybe
there was a small local manufacturer after all, perhaps in a country electorate,
or maybe the already precarious relations with the main exporting country were
seen as an issue). So, instead, the power to decide which skipping ropes are too
dangerous for sale is delegated under a legislative amendment to the regulator.
Not being super-human, he (or she) is inclined to be cautious. He knows from
painful experience that his agency will be lambasted publicly if any further
mishaps occur, but receive no credit at all if skipping ropes are able to be used
more liberally without mishap. So to be on the safe side, he issues a new
subordinate regulation placing a range of conditions on the marketing and sale
of all devices that could conceivably be used by children ’for the purpose, inter
alia, of skipping or related activities’.
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Things now start to get politically charged again, because the regulator has
inadvertently affected some key Australian enterprises producing a variety of
products, as well as many firms (and adult consumers) who use them. Moreover,
firms producing related goods are obliged to incur labelling and other costs to
stop their products from being used for skipping, as well as in convincing the
regulator about their compliance. Complaints are made to government at different
levels by the firms’ industry associations.
Eventually a review of the regulation is conducted — possibly as part of a wider
review of business ‘red tape’ — and the regulatory constraints are greatly eased
and their product coverage reduced.
Moral of the story
While the subject of this little story was fanciful, a close variant could have been
told based on any one of many actual examples at all levels of government,
including some major regulatory initiatives in recent years. It therefore illustrates
a number of failings in the way the legislative and other regulatory instruments
of public policy have been developed. The key words are knee-jerk political
responses, lack of analysis of costs and benefits, haphazard or limited consultation
and, above all, a ‘regulate first ask questions later’ culture within parts of
government; a culture that has been reinforced by a perception within the wider
community itself that government action equals regulation.
All this needs to change if Australia is to meet its prospective social and
environmental needs without compromising the economic growth that underpins
living standards. For example, how we design the regulatory framework to
achieve greenhouse emissions reductions looms as the critical determinant of
the magnitude of the costs to our economy of achieving any particular targets.
A challenge for governments
Good regulation demands good processes for developing and administering it.
The essential elements are not rocket science. They simply require clarity about
the nature of a perceived policy problem and why intervention would help, and
a detailed understanding of the pros and cons of different possible measures. To
do this well, however, can be demanding. Among the key requisites are an
ability to analyse the costs, benefits and risks associated with regulatory
‘solutions’, and to undertake effective consultation with those who bear these
(not just those calling for action).
And because today’s solutions may no longer be the right ones tomorrow, the
periodic review of existing regulation is integral to achieving good outcomes
over time.
There is nothing very novel in all this and, indeed, most governments, to varying
degrees, have requirements in place, including regulation impact statements for
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significant regulatory proposals. What would be new would be their effective
implementation and enforcement. This was what the Taskforce’s
recommendations were directed at, and many of its recommendations to entrench
good process and practice have been adopted at the Commonwealth level. There
have also been some steps forward within COAG, although the lowest common
denominator appears to have prevailed thus far.
Ultimately, real progress will depend on the ability to change the ‘regulate first’
culture that is pervasive within government, and achieve a better appreciation
within the wider community of the limits of regulation in dealing with society’s
complaints. I believe that procedural and institutional reforms will help on both








In a 2008 address to the Museum of American Finance entitled ‘Lessons from
Financial History’, Niall Ferguson, the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History
at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor at the Harvard Business
School observed:
Most regulations are improvised in the aftermath of a crisis. This is how
regulations, generally, are produced. They almost immediately become
inappropriate. So, regulators are always chasing the historical process.
Like generals, they are always fighting the last war, never the next one.1
The quote is interesting and catchy — but almost totally incorrect as regards
the assertion that regulations arise primarily in response to a crisis! The vast
bulk of regulations are modifications to those that already exist. Occasionally,
regulatory zeal is 'spurred on' because of a pressing, emergent issue and even,
occasionally, a crisis, but not often. Life is more mundane than we like to think.
I do, however, agree with the latter part of the quote. Indeed, regulators, like
generals, are often — if not always — fighting the last war. Regulation and
regulatory responsiveness, rests on the art of catching up. This is not inconsistent
with the ‘policy arts’ generally but, in the case of regulation, the goalposts —
or the battleground (to preserve the analogy) — are constantly shifting.
Ferguson’s address posits that financial markets, and the regulations that coalesce
around them, exist in dynamic — almost organic systems. Regulators are almost
always in a state of catch-up because the initial conditions prevailing at the time
regulations are formulated are likely to have changed significantly by the time
regulations have been promulgated.
Ferguson frames his remarks in the context of what he calls ‘evolutionary
economics’ — the application of Darwinian theory to financial markets. Whatever
one might think of such a construct, the metaphor of evolutionary niches has
interesting applications to regulatory processes. Gaps in nature, after all, are
prone to be filled. So too, gaps between regulation and the behaviours of the
regulated will be filled — possibly with new behaviours requiring regulation!
To the extent that the time lag between the articulation of a regulatory response
and the gazettal of regulation gives rise to ‘regulatory gaps’, the regulatory
process — like the environment within which it operates — needs to be dynamic
and adaptive. The problem is, as the authors of this monograph observe, that
regulatory processes are not as adaptive and dynamic as they should be.
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In his 16 May 2008 speech to the Mortgage and Finance Association of Australia
National Convention, the Minister for Superannuation and Corporate Law,
Senator Nick Sherry, observed:
… we are all operating in an increasingly complex and dynamic
environment. And with this complexity comes risk. An optimal
regulatory system will harness that risk, and allow us to achieve the
right balance between protection, wealth and growth.2
Certainly, complexity and dynamism are givens in any policy environment as
is the proposition that the management of complexity entails risk. The Minister’s
exhortation to ‘harness risk’ seems to suggest regulatory regimes and processes
capable of acting in an almost entrepreneurial fashion to leverage community
benefit from uncertainty in the environment. However, regulatory bodies exist
also to exercise what might be broadly termed ‘control functions’ and, by nature,
tend to be conservative both in their culture and operations. Managing risks
and limiting the sometimes unintended impact of individual or corporate
behaviour is, from this perspective, the essence of regulation. Institutional
conservatism does not, of necessity, preclude creativity and foresight although
experience tells us that the influence of stakeholders might result in governments
accepting regulatory provisions that are sub-optimal, in effect, ‘regulating’
policy inventiveness.
That said, creativity and foresight are sorely required — particularly if the Rudd
Government is serious about harmonising the regulatory regimes of the
Commonwealth and State/Territory governments as part of its drive toward a
less costly system of regulatory regimes. ‘Getting the balance right’, to employ
one of the currently popular political catch-phrases, will be essential to the
successful management of stakeholder interests. A recent survey commissioned
by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) found — not
surprisingly — that business thought the regulator should focus on principles
rather than rules; collaboration rather than enforcement. Consumers, for their
part, felt that regulators tread too softly and were not sufficiently robust in
terms of enforcement or the application of sanctions.3  Obviously, perceptions
of and attitudes toward regulation will differ. Achieving ‘balance’ in ways that
do not impose undue cost, unfairly transfer risk or compromise the public interest
will never be easy.
The environment is complex, the risks are great and the rewards of success and
the costs of failure will be enormous. The true measure of success will be how
effectively we are able to close the gap between promise and performance. This





1  Professor Niall Ferguson, ‘Lessons from financial history’, broadcast 11 may 2008 on Big Ideas, ABC
Radio National. The podcast of Professor Ferguson’s address can be downloaded from:
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/bigideas/stories/2008/2237927.htm
2  Accessed 19 May 2008 at http://minscl.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/
2008/012.htm&pageID=005&min=njs&Year=&DocType=







The aim of this monograph is to examine successive attempts by the
Commonwealth government to improve the quality of the processes by which
business regulation is made. Those attempts took place, for the most part, within
three broader waves of microeconomic and regulatory reform that have occurred
over the last 25 years. The first of these, which is not examined in this book,
commenced in the early 1980s under the first of the Hawke ALP governments
and was marked by major developments such as the floating of the dollar,
substantial reform of financial market regulation (including de-regulation) and
the rapid reduction of protective tariff barriers (Kelly 1992). The second wave
of reform commenced during the Hawke and Keating Governments of the later
1980s and early 1990s and continued into the twenty-first century, under the
auspices of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and the Howard
Coalition governments. It was marked by two broad sets of reforms: one
encompassed by the several hundred reviews of legislation and policy under
the National Competition Policy (NCP), focusing on policy content; and the other
related to reforms of the processes for making regulation, with the aim of ensuring
that, in the future, new and modified regulation was not subject to the
weaknesses that stimulated the NCP reviews. It is, as noted above, the ‘process’
reforms that constitute the primary focus on the book, as the NCP has been
subject to considerable examination (with regard to NCP see, for example,
Hollander 2006; Charles 2001; Deighton-Smith 2001; Butler 1996; Thomas 1996;
Churchman 1996; Harman 1996). The third wave of reform commenced in 2006,
often described as the National Reform Agenda, so it is somewhat premature to
describe it as a major wave of reform, although that is its intent.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts: the first and second
parts provide brief overviews of the second and third waves of microeconomic
reform in order to give a sense of perspective to the narrower concern with
regulatory process that is the major concern of the book; the final section provides
a brief description of the chapters of the book.
The second wave of reform: microeconomic reform in a
federal state
The 1980s saw a growing concern in OECD countries for their poor economic
performance since the early 1970s. It was a concern that found articulate and
persuasive voice in the OECD’s publication, ‘Structural Adjustment and Economic
Performance’ (1987). The study argued that while the poor economic performance
of member states certainly had been adversely influenced by the dramatic rise
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in oil prices during the 1970s, other major causes could be identified within
domestic arenas, especially the failure of national governments to undertake
those microeconomic reforms needed if their economies were to become more
efficient. The study, in effect, endorsed and gave weight to those in Australia
who had begun to push for a systematic program of microeconomic reform.
Hence, it is not surprising, for example, that the Industry Assistance Commission
(IAC), announced a two year inquiry strategy aimed at enabling it to identify
impediments to microeconomic reform and improved national economic efficiency
(IAC 1987: iv).
In Australia, in the more general context of economic reforms that had
commenced in the 1970s and intensified in what became the first wave of reform
under the Hawke Governments of the 1980s and early 1990s, the OECD concerns
were reflected in a rising national concern for microeconomic reform (often
described as structural adjustment or reform). As well as the more dramatic
reforms associated with the floating of the Australian dollar, the rapid reduction
in tariff barriers and the deregulation of the financial sector, there was evidence
of a concern to ensure that, in future, the quality of regulation would be
improved, with less negative economic impacts. This concern took institutional
shape in the creation of a number of special purpose regulatory review units at
both the state and federal levels, led by the Victorian Government. In 1986, for
example, the Commonwealth’s Business Regulation Review Unit (BRRU), was
established. BRRU was given responsibility for reviewing existing and proposed
Commonwealth legislation with regard to business (Wanna, Forster and Head
1991). This concern for the reform of regulatory processes was noted in Prime
Minister Hawke’s ALP Policy speech for the 1987 election and in his address to
the Business Council of Australia, where he emphasised the need to re-shape
economic institutions in order to meet the challenges of the 1990s (McAllister
and Moore, 1991: 147; Hawke 1987: 1598).
It was a concern taken up by then Treasurer, Paul Keating in the same year and
took on further significance with the transfer of the Industry Assistance
Commission (IAC, now the Productivity Commission), to the Treasury portfolio.
The significance lay in the fact that the Commission had begun to emphasise the
inefficiencies that resulted from government regulation at both state and federal
levels and the need for their reform and, with its transfer to the Treasury
portfolio, it now had the ear of that powerful department and its very influential
minister (see, for example, IAC 1986: 7, 8, 13-14, 18-19). The IAC made the need
for regulatory reform the centrepiece of its 1988 annual report, in which it cited
the OECD’s 1987 study as evidence of the need for such reform (IAC 1988). In
summary, it argued that the poor performance of the Australian economy was
caused, in large part, by excessive protection and too much inappropriate
regulation. In turn, protection and regulation were, for the most part, the
responsibility of vested interests who ‘sought preferment at the expense of the
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wider community’, thereby hindering reform (IAC 1988: 4). It also stressed that
‘progress in key areas is dependent on action by the States’, drawing attention
to the particular and frustrating difficulties of microeconomic reform in a federal
state where much constitutional authority for business regulation lay in the
hands of state governments (IAC 1988: iii, 15; 1989: 5-6). It emphasised what it
saw as:
… a proliferation of ad hoc groups and permanent agencies advising on
policy, each concerned with a particular part of the microeconomy and
not always apparently bringing an economy-wide perspective to bear
(IAC 1989).
The IAC’s views bore fruit in August 1989 when Prime Minister Hawke
announced the creation of a new body, the Industry Commission (IC), based on
the IAC but including the BRRU and the Inter-State Commission, with closer
coordination between the work of the new IC, the Bureau of Industry Economics
and the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics — a
coordination helped by the appointment of a senior Treasury official, Tony Cole,
as chairman of the IC (IAC 1989: iii).
While greater administrative attention to regulatory reform was important, it
needed substantial and public support from ministers at both the national and
state levels if it was to be effective. This came in the shape of, first, a special
series of Premiers’ Conferences aimed at improving national efficiency and
international competitiveness followed by the creation of the Council of Australia
Governments (COAG). They signalled what soon came be to called a ‘new
federalism’, designed in large part as an institutional mechanism to cope with
the demands of widespread regulatory reform (see Carroll and Painter 1995; and
Painter 1998 for more detailed elaborations). Within this promising political
context three major developments resulted:
• one, the National Competition Policy (Productivity Commission 2005: xv for
a fuller list of the NCP reforms);
• two, a parallel but separate series of reviews of regulations and related
institutions, several leading to intergovernmental agreements and new,
intergovernmental bodies such as the National Food Authority, National
Grid Management Council and National Training Authority; and,
• three, the substantial strengthening of the Commonwealth’s processes for
making regulation, centred on the regulatory impact statement process (RIS).
While the first two were primarily concerned with reviewing existing policy
and institutions, reforms to the process of making regulation aimed to ensure
that future new or modified regulation would minimise regulatory burdens on
the economy and businesses. Taken together, the three formed the core of what
was now a widespread, national process of reform — one that continued into
7
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the new century (Fels 1995; Charles 1995; Harman 1996; Painter 1998; Hollander
2006).
There was considerable anticipation that, on coming to office in 1996, the first
Howard Government would continue the Hawke-Keating reforms. Howard’s
‘neo-liberal’ governments were not expected to disrupt the general thrust of the
national process of reform set in train by the ALP at the state and national levels
as, for the most part, Howard had been an ardent supporter of regulatory reform
since his period as Treasurer in the last Fraser Coalition Government. More
importantly, as Opposition Leader, Howard had criticised the Hawke and Keating
Governments for not proceeding more rapidly with reform, albeit with differences
in emphasis, rather than general intent (Quiggin 2004: 171). One of the more
marked differences in emphasis in the early years of his first government, was
in relation to the need to reduce the regulatory burden on small business, a
sector he avidly courted in the 1996 election campaign. However, this proved
an easy ‘fit’ in the ongoing program of regulatory reform. Greater differences
did, of course, emerge in later Howard governments, notably in 2005, with the
introduction of ‘Work Choices’, a dramatic change to the industrial relations
system in Australia, aimed at freeing up labour markets and reducing the power
of trade unions in what Howard proclaimed was one of the last major pieces of
unfinished business in transforming the Australian economy (Howard 2005).
Howard’s efforts to further deregulate the labour market followed limited moves
in this direction by previous Labor governments. The last Hawke Government
and by the Keating Government in 1993 introduced measures to decentralise
enterprise bargaining and Keating, in particular, had overseen a reduction in
the power of the AIRC, the introduction of enterprise bargaining and had
permitted registered collective agreements in the non-union sector.
The third wave of reform: 2006 and the future
The second wave of reform faded away somewhat unevenly and, with varying
degrees of success, given the differing life spans of the three major developments,
National Competition Policy (NCP) reform, regulatory reviews and process reform,
based around the preparation of Regulatory Impact Statements (RIS). The reviews
conducted as part of the NCP process are still ongoing as of the time of writing
but for the most part are completed (Productivity Commission 2005). The various,
separate, large scale, individual reviews were implemented at various times after
1996 and the RIS-focused reforms to the making of regulation were implemented
by the Commonwealth in the 1996-8 period (Carroll 2006). Hence, the minds of
decision-makers began to focus on the future: on the question of what to do
next, with discussion focused in the Productivity Commission, COAG and, more
generally, in the federal and state political executives, notably in the Victorian
Government’s ‘Shared Future’ project (Allen Consulting Group 2004; Banks
2004; Bracks 2005; COAG 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007).
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In one sense, the answer to the question of what to do next had been partly
determined by the results of the second wave of regulatory reform, notably by
its less successful elements and those areas of regulation that it had not
encompassed, suggesting that they now needed attention. Gary Banks, the Chair
of the Productivity Commission, for example, in reviewing the NCP, concluded
that it had yielded substantial benefits across the community but that the
implementation process had not been perfect, that the public interest tests of
existing regulation had not always been rigorously applied, that the
independence of some reviews had been questionable and their conduct less
than transparent and the outcomes of several key reviews rather problematic
(Banks 2004). His view was reflected in the Productivity Commission’s detailed
assessment of the NCP Reforms a few months later (Productivity Commission
2005). Against this background, he suggested that:
• infrastructure reform must continue to be a high priority, especially in
relation to energy, water and transport;
• not all anti-competitive regulation had been properly addressed — notably
in relation to anti-dumping and cabotage regimes — as well as ‘second round’
reviews of wheat marketing, compulsory third party and workers’
compensation insurance and the pharmacy sector;
• Australia’s competition and regulatory architecture could be further
improved, with an emphasis on improving regulatory processes,
anti-competitive legislation, pricing regimes and consumer protection;
• coordinated national reform should extend beyond the current NCP to include
health care and natural resource management but with a lower priority for
aged care, education and training;
• health care and natural resource management were the highest priorities,
particularly with regard to the overlapping responsibilities of the federal
and state governments; and
• tax policy and labour market reforms should continue, building on what
had been achieved (Banks 2004).
Banks’ views were in several respects similar to those held by the Victorian
Government of Premier Bracks. Some months earlier, in May 2004, the Allen
Consulting Group had prepared a report for the Victorian Government that
emphasised the need for a major new series of national, coordinated reforms in
health and education, as part of the government’s ‘Shared Future’, project (Allen
Consulting Group 2004). These were endorsed by Premier Bracks and became
the centrepiece of a new, national reform initiative he submitted to COAG,
emphasising, in contrast to the earlier period of microeconomic reform, the need
for reforms to human capital, constituting what he described as a ‘third wave’,
of reform (Bracks 2005). The vision was described as one:
9
Introduction
… of not only a strong economy, but also a healthy, skilled and motivated
population where all enjoy the opportunity and incentive to be full and
active participants in the life of the nation (Bracks 2005: 7).
It highlighted, in common with the views of Banks, the need for further
development of economic competitiveness by undertaking regulatory reviews
and building world-class infrastructure and the need for an improved health
system but, in contrast, also the need to improve levels of educational and
training achievement and the need to remove disincentives and barriers to labour
force participation (Bracks 2005: 8). Interestingly, as with the OECD’s 1987
report, the influence of the OECD on Australian policy debates again can be seen
in Premier Bracks drawing upon an OECD report to support his case for a further
wave of reform: a report that argued that Australia needed to achieve significant
increases in productivity and participation if it was to rise to the never-ending
challenge of international competition (Bracks 2005: 10, drawing upon OECD
2005).
In addition, Premier Bracks’ vision differed somewhat from that of Banks with
regard to the details of the institutional framework that would be necessary to
achieve this ‘third wave’ of reform. Bracks’ view was that, while COAG would
retain primary responsibility for setting strategic directions, a National Reform
Council should be established to guide the process. The Council might be assisted
by bodies such as the Productivity Commission and it would appraise progress
and make recommendations on funding flows according to a formula determined
by COAG (Bracks 2005: 40-41). Also, it would be an independent body making
recommendations to COAG on the funds needed for further work, albeit on the
basis of a formula to be determined by COAG (Bracks 2005: 11, 40-47). Banks,
in contrast, stressed that the successful implementation of the proposed reforms
would require both leadership and inter-governmental cooperation on the basis
of ‘robust’ arrangements that included well-articulated reform objectives and
underlying principles, were based upon a rigorous analysis of options and
provided means for the independent monitoring of progress (Banks 2005;
Productivity Commission 2005). However, he had not provided any further
detail, which came in the Productivity Commission’s assessment of NCP reforms
(2005, especially chapter 12).
The Commission, while supporting the general need for an effective institutional
framework for the new wave of reforms, recommended that it be divided into
two related parts: one, for reforms that were a continuation of those commenced
under the NCP, the existing framework should continue to be used, focused on
the National Competition Council and COAG; and two, for the reforms in health
care and vocational education, ‘stand-alone’, sectoral programs should be
developed. However, monitoring and reporting on reform progress and outcomes
should be undertaken by a body or bodies independent of those responsible for
10
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policy development and implementation (Productivity Commission 2005: 380).
In other words, progress and outcomes should be monitored by a politically
neutral body, not any of the governments involved.
As might be expected, given a fair degree of policy consensus, the ALP state
governments and the Coalition Government of John Howard had little difficulty
in agreeing on the need for further reform if the Australian economy was to
remain competitive. They had somewhat more difficulty in agreeing on exactly
what should be done, notably, as regards institutional arrangements and funding.
Compromise was reached in the form of a three-pronged reform agenda in 2006,
with the announcement of a new ‘National Reform Agenda’, focusing on human
capital, competition and, yet again, regulatory processes (COAG 2006a; 2006b).
While it has excited surprisingly limited public and media attention to date,
there is little doubt that the work it undertakes will become of increasing
importance in the years ahead. This was made clear by the new Commonwealth
government of Kevin Rudd that came to office in late 2007. It was committed to
a continuing program of regulatory reform, including those put forward by the
Taskforce on Regulation in 2006, arguing that the Howard governments had
failed to continue the microeconomic reform process instigated by Labor
governments in the 1980s and 1990s, with the result that the regulatory burden
had grown and Australian productivity had fallen (Emerson 2007).
Rudd’s critique of Howard seemed to imply that regulating reform was more
rhetoric than reality; followed a pattern of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ followed
by relative inertia; and proved difficult for governments to accomplish in the
long term. We investigate these themes in the remainder of this book.
The structure of the book
As described above, this chapter has provided a brief introduction to the origins
and development of the waves of regulatory reform that have characterised the
work of Australian Commonwealth governments over the last 25 years. Chapter
Two examines the development and performance of the Commonwealth
government’s Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) system, designed to improve
regulation-making processes in the somewhat ambitious hope that its output —
regulation — would be of better quality and impose less cost in achieving the
desired impacts on business. It argues that, in practice, the performance of RIS
has been variable and less than was hoped — a performance explained by a
number of factors, especially the fluctuating levels of ministerial and head of
department/agency commitment to the system, a sometimes less than adequate
integration of RIS with existing policy development processes and varying
standards of analysis, particularly as regards the costing of regulatory proposals.
Chapter Three examines in more detail a neglected aspect of the Commonwealth’s
system for ensuring regulatory quality, the development and use of a system of
11
Introduction
regulatory performance indicators (RPIs) in the period 1998-2006. It provides a
case study of the government’s attempts to improve regulatory quality and
performance, in line with the urgings of the OECD. Its conclusion is that the
value and use of the RPIs was limited, although the experience gained should
prove valuable in current attempts to improve existing systems of performance
indicators (see Productivity Commission 2007).
Chapter Four, by ex-public servant turned academic, Chris Walker, argues that
the processes of regulatory reform that have occurred since the early 1990s, with
their emphasis on the need for regulatory uniformity and simplicity, have
neglected the need to improve our capacity to manage complex regulatory and
operational systems. Indeed, he suggests that one of the results of the reforms
of the 1990s was the creation of more complex regulatory systems, which he
illustrates with reference to railway systems and the role of the National
Transport Commission. Rather than setting targeted programs of reform that
strive for the holy grail of regulatory simplicity, he suggests that COAG should
be seeking to transform arrangements within policy sectors so that agencies and
stakeholders can better manage and respond to inevitable regulatory complexity.
Chapter Five is the first of three chapters that look forward, rather than back,
in introducing the National Reform Agenda as proposed by the Victorian
Government and endorsed by COAG. Its author, Helen Silver, played an
important role in its development and promulgation. She argues the need for a
further wave of reform at both state and federal level if Australia is to meet the
major social and economic challenges it is facing, emphasising the need for
cooperative reform within the COAG structure.
Chapter Six, by Peter Carroll, provides a critical assessment of the
Commonwealth’s Rethinking Regulation Program, based on the recommendations
of the Banks taskforce and the government’s response to its principal
recommendations — a major plank in the third period of regulatory reform.
Carroll’s overall assessment is that while there is much in the report to be
commended, the need is for greater commitment and support for existing systems
for making and implementing business regulation rather than a fundamental
rethinking of the system for making business regulation.
Chapter Seven, by consultant and ex-public servant Rex Deighton-Smith, notes
that recent decades have seen a substantial move by regulators in Australia, as
in many other OECD countries, to adopt performance-based and process-based
regulation, in preference to traditional prescriptive regulation. This is a shift
actively encouraged by regulatory reformers and the author argues that recent
experience increasingly reveals a range of regulatory quality and regulatory
governance concerns arising as a result of this trend. They include problems
relating to transparency, public accountability and regulatory complexity and
12
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a set of recommendations are developed suggesting what might be done to
improve performance.
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Chapter 2. The Regulatory Impact
System: Promise and performance
Peter Carroll
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the performance of the
Commonwealth government’s Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) system, a system
first introduced in 1986 but modified and strengthened in 1996 as part of a move
to further improve the quality of new and modified regulation and, hopefully,
minimise adverse impacts on business and economic performance. It argues that,
while its proponents were keen to see its effective implementation in all
departments and agencies — proposing that, as part of the broader process of
regulatory reform, it would lead to an improved quality of regulation — actual
practice showed that the performance of the RIS system was limited. It resulted
in some improvements in the processes for making regulation, however, the
quality of the resulting regulatory content and the analysis supporting that
content improved little, if at all. It is further argued that this limited performance
can be explained by a number of factors, especially the varying levels of
ministerial and head of department/agency commitment to the system; a
sometimes less than adequate integration of RIS with existing policy development
processes; and, varying standards of regulatory analysis, particularly as regards
cost/benefit assessments. The chapter is divided into three major sections: the
first provides a brief, descriptive outline of the RIS system as modified in the
mid-1990s; the second examines the performance of RIS from 1986-1997; the
third examines its performance following reforms implemented during the period
from 1998-2006 but prior to further modifications to the system introduced in
late 2006.
The RIS system in the Australian Government
RIS is both a document and, most importantly, the documented result of a
mandated process and approach to policy analysis intended to improve the
quality of policy-making in the Australian Federal Government in relation to
the regulation of business. At the heart of the process, as described by the
Commonwealth’s then Office of Regulatory Review (the ORR), were seven key
elements that, when successfully completed, it was hoped would provide the
decision-maker with the information needed to make an informed decision and
better quality regulation. The seven key elements constituted a simple, rational,
process-based model of policy-making familiar to all policy analysts, laying out
the major tasks that were to be undertaken at each stage of the process, as follows:
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• a description of the problem or issues which give rise to the need for action
and broad goal of the proposed regulation;
• a specification of the desired objective(s);
• a description of the options (regulatory and/or non-regulatory), expressed
as a regulatory form or type, that may constitute a viable means for achieving
the desired objective(s);
• an assessment of the impact of each option on consumers, business,
government and the community — including costs and benefits — noting
particularly the impacts on competition, small business and trade;
• a consultation statement detailing who was consulted — with a summary of
views from the main affected parties — or specific reasons why consultation
was inappropriate;
• a recommended option, with an explanation of why it was selected and others
were not; and
• a detailed strategy for the implementation and review of the preferred option
(Office of Regulation Review 1998: A2).
The introduction of the RIS system predated the NCP reviews. In 1996-97 RIS
was modified and became mandatory for all reviews of existing regulation,
proposed new or amended regulation as well as proposed treaties involving
regulation that would: directly affect business; have a significant indirect effect
on business; or, restrict competition (Head and McCoy 1991; Office of Regulation
Review 1998). The RIS system complemented the NCP reviews of existing
regulation by focusing on future regulation. Its remit applied to all primary
legislation, subordinate legislation and quasi-regulation — the latter referring
to the wide range of rules or arrangements where governments influence
businesses to comply but which do not form part of explicit government
regulation (for example, industry codes of practice, guidance notes,
industry-government agreements and accreditation schemes) (Office of Regulation
Review 1998: A2-3).
The RIS did not apply to state, territory or local government in the Australian
federal system, except insofar as any one or more of them were a party to a
regulation developed on an intergovernmental basis within the Council of
Australian Governments (COAG), although all bar one of the state and territory
jurisdictions have RIS-type systems of their own. An RIS system is also applied
by COAG, being largely identical with the federal RIS. In addition, RIS does not
apply to tax regulation (although a modified type of RIS is used in this regard)
and it is not applied in a number of relatively minor areas (Office of Regulation
Review 1998: A4).
With regard to the relevant, mandated stages of RIS:
• departments, agencies and statutory authorities considering regulation that
might impact on business were required to consult the ORR (now renamed
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the Office of Best Practice Regulation) at an early stage in the policy
development process — the ORR had the authority to decide, in normal
circumstances, whether or not an RIS was required;
• departments and agencies were required to consult with the ORR when
developing terms of reference for reviews of existing legislation or regulations
that impact on business;
• all RISs were to be developed in consultation with the ORR;
• draft RISs were to be sent to the ORR for comment and advice;
• the ORR was to advise departments and agencies whether or not a draft RIS
complied with the government’s requirements and, importantly, whether
or not they contained an adequate level of analysis;
• the ORR was to receive all cabinet submissions proposing regulation or
treaties and report to cabinet on both compliance with the RIS process and
on whether or not the level of analysis was adequate;
• the Productivity Commission was to report annually on departmental and
agency performance with regard to the completed RIS, both as to process
and as to the quality of analysis provided in support of the proposed
regulation;
• the Office of Small Business (the OSB), from 1999, also was required to publish
a set of regulation performance indicators (RPIs) for departments and agencies
— assisted by the ORR — and comment on regulation impacting on small
business (Office of Regulation Review 1998:A10-14).
While the RIS process was and remains mandatory, the ORR’s judgement as to
the adequacy of an RIS process or analysis did not invalidate — or necessarily
lead to the rejection of — a proposed regulation. That responsibility remained
with the decision-maker involved, notably the Prime Minister and the Cabinet
(Office of Regulation Review 1998: A12).
Regulatory performance and RIS: 1986-1997 a case of
infant neglect?
RIS was introduced in 1986 as a new policy-making process coordinated by a
new Business Regulation Review Unit (BRRU) (Head and McCoy 1991: 158). As
noted in Head and McCoy, by the early 1990s, while it is difficult to assess the
impact of the new system in any kind of detail, its impact, along with that of
BRRU, seems to have been negligible (Head and McCoy 1991: 163). Indeed,
insofar as the departments and agencies responsible for making and implementing
regulation were concerned, there was no new system. Rather, at best, BRRU had
encouraged departments and agencies to view the development of new or
amended regulation with regard to business somewhat more critically, in line
with the government’s principle of the minimum of effective regulation (Industry
Commission 1993: 272). In turn, BRRU provided advice to cabinet with regard
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to the regulations related to business that were submitted to it, advice that seems
to have had little impact (Head and McCoy 1991: 163-4).
A number of factors account for RIS’s lack of success at this stage. RIS was
imposed upon departments and agencies by successive governments, eagerly
supported by peak business associations and, increasingly, the government’s
own Productivity Commission. The departments were not enthusiastic about
the imposition, with its implication that their existing policy development
systems were inadequate. In addition, there was some feeling that the system
had an ideological, rather than a regulation improvement purpose, aimed at
freeing markets from regulatory control without convincing justification for the
reform (Head and McCoy 1991). Also, RIS represented, at least in its earlier years,
an increased workload and, if it was to be accommodated in the fashion desired
by executive government, a degree of change to established processes and
practices. Such organisational changes, welcome or not, take time to implement.
In 1988, a performance audit report of BRRU by the Commonwealth
Auditor-General tended to confirm the above views but without reference to its
ideological status, noting that it was not achieving its stated objective of
comprehensively reviewing all targeted government regulation, or advising
government on all new regulatory proposals, largely because of insufficient
resources (BRRU had only six staff, plus a varying number of business executives
seconded to it for short periods at this time), the lack of a comprehensive
information base as to what regulations existed and the failure of some
departments to provide the required RIS (Auditor General 1989). As a later
publication noted of the period: ‘ministers and regulatory departments/agencies
routinely eschewed preparation of RISs’ (Argy, Johnson 2003: 22). The
Auditor-General’s report and recommendations — perhaps combined with a
desire to avoid business criticism of the lack of effectiveness of BRRU in
progressing the review of business regulation — led to its 1990 transfer to an
independent statutory authority, the Industry Commission, where it was given
a new title, the Office of Regulation Review (Head and McCoy 1991:159).
Despite being brought under the authority of the Industry Commission, it soon
became apparent that the ORR was continuing to have difficulty in achieving
its objectives, as indicated by an external review conducted in 1993 (Industry
Commission 1993b). The review noted that while the ORR had a useful role and
had developed an effective framework for assessing the impact of regulation,
there were several major constraints on its effectiveness, including deficiencies
in the existing policy and procedural framework. As a result, it was:
• only able to comment on a small proportion of the total volume of new and
amended business regulation introduced each year;




• constrained by the propensity of other government objectives to take priority
over regulation review objectives; and
• devoting too many resources to its cabinet role (advice with regard to RISs
that came to cabinet), relative to its other functions (Office of Regulation
Review 1993: 271-2).
Thus, the review found that, in general, the ORR’s formal responsibilities
exceeded its capabilities and recommended that there be:
• a re-weighting of its work priorities to place greater emphasis on its educative
and research role, with a more focused and selective approach to its cabinet
role;
• measures introduced to increase awareness and understanding of regulation
review policies within the bureaucracy; and
• measures to raise the public profile of the ORR and regulation review policy
(Office of Regulation Review 1993: 272).
These conclusions indicated real limitations on the ability of the ORR to evaluate
and comment on RISs and its ability to provide: (1) departments with advice
aimed at improving regulation; or, (2) the cabinet with appropriate, timely advice
as to the adequacy of submitted RIS in terms of either process or the quality and
content of the proposed regulation. The reason was simple: the ORR did not
have the resources to achieve these aims. In turn, this suggests that either
successive governments had underestimated the resources necessary for the
task, assuming that they were aware that this was the case, or they were not
sufficiently concerned to increase resources to an appropriate level. In other
words the necessary political and executive level commitment to, and support
of, RIS, had not been forthcoming. It implied, also, that there had been little
improvement in the quality of regulation-making in departments and agencies
for — given that it was the ORR’s role to promote such improvement and that
it had not been able to do so to any great extent — then it was unlikely that
they had improved their performance on pre-RIS times.
There is no systematic, quantitative empirical data on the performance of RIS
for the 1986-96 period. However, some clues can be gained by looking at
performance levels for the period 1996-97 — a period in which major changes
to RIS were being put in place but were not yet fully operative and so were
likely to have been similar to performance levels for the 1986-96 era. The data
suggests that performance was very limited, with compliance with RIS being
very low. Out of 121 Bills, for example, that required the preparation of a RIS
for consideration by cabinet, departments provided the ORR with a RIS in only
13 cases (10.7%). This very low level of compliance with process at a time when
greater political commitment to the reform of business regulation and RIS in
particular, was being strongly expounded by the new government of Prime
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Minister John Howard is surprising. As the ORR noted with regard to the
pre-1996 period, ‘there was little commitment to the process and a lack of any
effective sanctions’ (Office of Regulation Review 1997: 44).
In summary, much of the period from 1986 to 1997 had been a slow and somewhat
painful period of birth and infancy for the RIS system, with widespread
non-compliance with the process and little discernible impact on the quality
and extent of new or amended regulation regarding business. A lack of political
commitment and a lack of head of department and agency support resulted in
policy development processes remaining largely unchanged with an
under-resourced ORR often unable to discharge its advisory functions. However,
at the end of this period, the political and public commitment of the new Howard
Government together with the expanded coverage and authority given to RIS
and other associated developments, suggested that the future might be more
promising.
RIS performance 1998-2006: improving, but could do
better?
In the period 1995-97 the RIS system was reformed as part of a broader set of
reforms that commenced under the ALP government of Prime Minister Paul
Keating but reached fruition in the first two years of the first Howard
government. In summary, the major reforms were:
• the expansion of the ORR and an emphasis that RIS was mandatory;
• that RISs were to be tabled as part of the explanatory documents when
proposals for legislative change were put before Parliament;
• that the Assistant Treasurer, although not a cabinet minister, be responsible
for regulatory best practice, as a visible sign of a greater political commitment
to regulatory reform;
• that the ORR was to report to cabinet on compliance with RIS requirements
for specific regulatory proposals;
• the Productivity Commission was to report annually, in public reports, on
overall departmental and agency compliance with RIS requirements, as
regards both process and analytical quality, commencing in 1997–98 (Office
of Regulation Review 1997; Productivity Commission 1998; Howard 1997);
and
• the reforms were largely in line with the review and analyses produced for
the first Howard government by the Productivity Commission and, especially,
the Bell Report, that had investigated the impact of regulation on small
business (Productivity Commission 1996; Bell Report 1996).
While the Productivity Commission and the ORR might have been happy with
most of the general intent and recommendations of the Bell Report and the
government’s response to the report, the decision to establish a separate Office
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of Small Business (the OSB), with new regulatory review and reporting
responsibilities, must have been of some concern. The OSB was to be consulted
for all cabinet submissions that might have an impact on small business, including
regulations of all types and to develop and report annually on a system of nine
regulation performance indicators (RPIs). The departments and agencies would
monitor and provide the OSB with the data related to their own performance,
with the OSB reporting annually on their performance against the RPIs, with
the first report to be made in 1999 (Productivity Commission 1999:12). RPIs were
seen as an important adjunct to the RIS system, providing information on the
effectiveness with which agencies were implementing regulation reform measures
and enabling benchmarking of agency performance. In a somewhat clumsy
arrangement, however, the ORR was to be responsible for collecting and
monitoring agency performance in relation to three of the RPIs and for providing
those details to the OSB (Productivity Commission 1999: 12). The situation was
made even more awkward in 1998, for Prime Minister Howard committed his
second government to the introduction of a system of annual regulatory plans
for all departments and agencies in his ‘A Small Business Agenda for the New
Millennium’, again to be reported on by the OSB, without the direct involvement
of the ORR. The regulatory plans were to provide business and the community
with timely access to information about past and planned changes to
Commonwealth regulation, with the aim of making it easier for businesses to
take part in the development of regulation.
In the first two years of the reformed RIS system (1996-97) compliance with RIS
was, however, far lower than the average for the 1999-2006 period. As the
Productivity Commission put it, these two years were a learning period for all
concerned and it was expected that the level of compliance would improve
(Productivity Commission 1999: xviii). It would have been more informative to
have noted that there had been a learning period of at least 12 years, from 1986,
not two years, with little systematic data on performance in the earlier period
being collected. This little matter aside, the major reasons identified for the poor
performance in these two years were, in summary: a lack of awareness of the
requirements of the new system; varying degrees of understanding of and priority
accorded to, the new system; a lack of resources for the ORR; and a slow process
of cultural and organisation change resulting in a lack of integration of RIS into
departmental policy processes (Productivity Commission 1998; and 1999).
In some cases, especially in regulatory agencies associated with COAG but also
in some sections of major departments, communication of the new, reformed
status and requirements of RIS simply had not percolated through to those with
responsibility for making or amending regulation. Uncertainty about the coverage
of RIS persisted even where communication had been effective, particularly in
relation to subordinate legislation, quasi-regulation and treaties — to which it
now applied (Productivity Commission 1998: xviii-xix). This lack of awareness
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and understanding applied particularly in COAG and the ORR noted that agencies
associated with COAG claimed that they were not informed about, nor trained
in, the new guidelines (Productivity Commission 1998: 70).
Rather embarrassingly for the new government, it was also apparent that several
ministers’ offices were not aware that the RIS requirements applied to them and,
given the lack of awareness and understanding of what the reformed RIS now
involved, it is not surprising that there were also examples of differences of
opinion between the ORR staff and departmental staff as to how to interpret the
RIS Guide (Productivity Commission 1998: xix). On a more positive note, for the
relatively few RIS that were submitted in the 1996-97 period, the ORR felt that
the level of analysis was adequate in 92% of cases (Office of Regulation Review
1997: 44).
What then, was the performance of this new, reformed RIS after the initial
learning period? In terms of volume, as indicated in Table 2.1, in the period
from 1999-2000 to 2004-05, a total of 11,545 Bills and Disallowable instruments
were introduced, with the ORR receiving 4,832 new RIS queries with regard to
this total, of which it advised that 1,085 (9.4%), required an RIS. The relatively
small proportion of Bills and instruments subject to RIS was because most of the
latter involved minor amendments to existing regulation that did not require
the preparation of an RIS (Productivity Commission 2005: 79).
Table 2.1 Australian Government regulatory and RIS activities, 1999-2000
2004-052003-042002-032001-022000-011999-2000 
255216881789191816071991Total number of regulations introduced
167174132175171266Queries for which the ORR advised an RISwas required
6.510.37.39.110.613.3% RIS of total no. of regulations
(See Productivity Commission 2005: 78, for further details)
In aggregate, the extent to which the RISs submitted by departments and agencies
were regarded as adequate, using the measures developed by the ORR, is indicated
in Table 2.2, below, for RIS at both the decision-making stage of the
regulation-making process and the Parliamentary tabling stage (see Productivity
Commission 2000, chapter three, for a description of how the measure is
calculated). On average, 84% of the RISs at the decision-making stage were
regarded as adequate, rising to 92% for the parliamentary tabling stage — the
higher rate for the latter being, perhaps, a function of the greater risk of causing
embarrassment for the minister, the government and the department if an
inadequate RIS was provided for parliamentary and public scrutiny. The lower
rate of adequacy for RIS developed at the decision-making stage was of concern,
as it suggested that at least 16% of decisions on proposed new, or amended




However, what also becomes evident is that the overall levels of RIS performance
indicated in Table 2.2 for the crucial, decision-making stage, concealed marked
variations in regulation performance. In particular, the levels of compliance
achieved for more significant, new or modified regulation was substantially
lower than the overall average for all regulation, even though it might be
expected that departments would be most careful in the adequacy of their analysis
for more significant regulation. The average level of compliance for the 2000-05
period for more significant regulation, for example, was only 68%, compared
to 87% for less significant regulation. It also fluctuated considerably from year
to year, ranging from a low of 46% for more significant regulation in 2002-03,
after some four years of experience with the new system, to a high of 94% a
year later. There was less but still considerable fluctuation for less significant
regulation, from a high of 92% in 2003-04.
Table 2.2 RIS compliance, 1999-2000 to 2004-05
2004-052003-042002-032001-022000-011999-2000Decision-making stage
68105113128129169No. of RIS required
85114139145157207No. of RIS judged adequate
809281888282%
      Parlt. tabling stage
5982113116118163No. of RIS required
6686119123133179No. of RIS judged adequate
899595948991%
(See Productivity Commission 2005: 15, for further details)
There is a similar variation in performance when RIS are broken down into
primary legislation (Bills), legislative instruments (largely subordinate legislation),
non-legislative instruments, quasi-regulation (largely codes of conduct and target
requirements) and RIS prepared for treaties. With regard to primary legislation
the adequacy of performance fell from 80% in 1999-2000, to 76% in 2004-05,
suggesting that RIS performance was not improving, even if it was not getting
substantially worse, a disappointing result after eight years of operation for the
new RIS system. The RIS performance for treaties, while involving only small
numbers per annum and those treaties for which negotiations had commenced
before the new RIS system came into effect, was very poor. As might be expected,
the variation in aggregate RIS performance is mirrored in variation by department
and agency. While the total number of RIS for each of the 19 departments and
agencies whose proposals required an RIS is relatively small, only 10 departments
and agencies were fully compliant at the decision-making stage in 2004-05 — a
sharp drop from 2003-04. Nine departments or agencies were not compliant in
whole or in part and the nine failed to develop, in total, some 14 RIS, with three
of those that they did prepare having an inadequate level of analysis
(Productivity Commission 2005: 31).
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With regard to RISs prepared for COAG, performance was poorer, with the
average for the period being 76%, nearly 10% lower than that for the
decision-making stage for non-COAG RIS (Productivity Commission 2005: 66).
There was also considerable variance in the performance by Ministerial Council
and National Standard Setting Bodies within COAG (Productivity Commission
2005: 66-7). Despite this variable performance there was a substantial average
increase in process performance over the whole of the period 1996-2006 but it
was an increase that had largely peaked by the beginning of the 2000s, following
the rapid increase in 1998-2000 and the quality of content of RISs improved more
slowly.
What factors help explain this variable and sometimes disappointing RIS
performance, even if the very poor performance in the learning period, 1996-98,
is not included? In drawing upon the sources available four broad factors seem
to have been of most importance. They are:
• RIS system design factors and poor communication of expectations;
• varying degrees of failure to integrate RIS into traditional departmental and
agency policy development processes;
• limitations in analytical expertise; and
• varying levels of political commitment and support (Banks 2006a: chapter
seven).
Deficiencies in the design of the RIS system itself have become apparent over
time and were highlighted in the recent Banks Report, which found, in assessing
both RIS and departmental policy development processes, that the requirements
for good regulatory process had generally not been well discharged, agreeing
with business groups that this had been a major contributor to the problems
identified with specific regulations (Banks 2006a: v). One of the major limitations
was the relative lack of initial emphasis in the RIS process on the need for at
least adequate consultation with business in designing regulations, leading, it
could be argued, to poorer quality regulation. A survey undertaken by the
Australian Public Service Commission, for example, found that only 25% of
regulatory agencies had engaged with the public when developing regulations,
a surprisingly low proportion (Australian Public Service Commission 2005: 56).
While it does not necessarily follow that limited or no consultation will result
in poorer quality regulatory proposals, it is certainly possible and, where they
do occur, will tend to alienate the businesses upon which regulation impacts.
There is, of course, something of a dilemma with regard to increased consultation,
for, if the RIS and the ORR called, as they did, for greater and more effective
consultation, then it might also increase the danger of regulatory ‘capture’, by
business interests.
A second limitation was the ineffectiveness of the system of regulatory
performance indicators (RPI) introduced in 1998 and managed by the Office of
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Small Business. The RPI were introduced in order to provide information for
decision-makers as to departmental, process-based performance with regard to
business regulation (Carroll 2007). However, in practice they had little or no
impact on departments, with few departments or agencies using them — at least
not explicitly or in published sources — as a means of identifying the causes of
poor performance or for improving on existing performance. In this regard it is
interesting to note that the recent Banks Report on the performance of the existing
RIS system made no specific mention, positive or negative, of the existing system
of RPI. Similarly, while the government agreed to all of the recommendations
of the Banks Report with regard to the need for better performance indicators
it made no specific reference to the existing system of RPI, either positive or
negative. The failure, in both cases, to provide an assessment of the RPI implies
that they were regarded as relatively ineffective, or not well known, or both —
a view supported by most of those interviewed by the author in a range of
government departments and agencies. Indeed, it proved difficult to locate
persons within departments who were aware of the existence of RPI. Those that
were aware indicated, for the most part, that the RPI had been of restricted value
and were rarely used by departments in considering their performance. Yet, the
information was available, if not used, suggesting that there was a considerable
reluctance by ministers and senior officials in line departments and the Cabinet
Office to take firm action to improve performance.
A frequently noted cause of poor RIS performance by the Productivity
Commission, in both its annual reviews of regulation and by its chair and other
senior staff, was a continuing failure on the part of some departments and
agencies to fully integrate the RIS system with their established policy
development processes (see, for example, Productivity Commission 2005: xx,
25). The result, too often, was that staff tended to regard RIS as merely an ‘add
on’ to established departmental procedures, producing the necessary RIS
documentation too late in the decision-making process to have any influence,
after the proposed regulatory approach had already been determined. There
were a number of reasons for this lack of integration:
• a continuing lack of belief in the RIS system and its value by at least some
ministers and senior public servants, resulting in a less than full commitment
to support its integration and a lack of effort and enthusiasm by those
responsible for undertaking RIS within departments; and
• the continuing lack of experience in the application of RIS by public servants.
In the case of any one department only a limited number of RIS are required per
annum and those that are conducted are allocated, very often, to different staff
in different divisions within the same department, often to those with
responsibility for the regulatory area in question. Hence, unless the department
has only the one centrally-located policy development unit with staff serving
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with the unit for several years (which is normally not the case) then it is unlikely
that any one individual or group of individuals gains expertise in with RIS, even
over a period of years, a phenomenon noted by ORR staff.
One of the key causes of poor quality regulatory proposals has been varying
and often inadequate levels of analysis by departments and agencies, especially
of the costs and benefits of the regulatory options identified in their RIS. This
has been of continuing concern to the ORR and the Productivity Commission,
with, for example, recent examples of inadequate analysis including a department
not clearly identifying the problem the proposed regulation was supposed to
address, another not containing a summary of views received from stakeholders
and the community, nor any discussion of how these views had been considered
and another not providing any quantification of regulatory compliance costs
(Productivity Commission 2005: 26). Where RIS were prepared but failed the
ORR adequacy test, an inadequate analysis of costs, benefits and impacts on
business, small and large, was typically the case (Productivity Commission 2005:
26). Productivity Commission concerns about poor levels of analysis led its chair,
Gary Banks, to assert that 10% of tabled RIS did not even consider compliance
costs and only 20% made an attempt at quantifying them (Banks 2005: 10).
Similarly, a study of Victorian State government RIS and a small sample of COAG
RIS in 2001 found that those conducted on behalf of the state government were
clearly superior on all 10 of the criteria used in the study to those conducted for
COAG (Deighton-Smith 2006).
As noted above, political support for RIS varied in extent and intensity over
time. The primary reason for the variation is not hard to find, occurring, in
particular, where ministers are faced, for example, with an RIS assessment that
judges their new or modified regulatory proposal as not adequate. In such
situations they face a quasi-conflict of interest situation: on the one hand
committed under the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility to support
cabinet’s formal support for RIS and the ORR’s assessments of adequacy but, on
the other hand, faced with a failed regulatory proposal if the RIS evaluation is
negative. Moreover, the staff of ministerial offices, the heads of departments
and senior public servants are well aware of this situation. Whatever their
personal feelings on the matter, it would be a very brave person who resisted
the wishes of a minister by advising that a favoured regulation was not to be
recommended and pursued, following an averse RIS assessment from the ORR.
Similarly, when judging an RIS to be inadequate, it is difficult — but not
impossible — for the ORR and Productivity Commission staff, even at the most
senior levels, to gain the agreement of the department involved of the need to
improve the RIS in question. It is even more difficult to persuade them to amend
or withdraw a RIS, especially where it has been presented to the ORR at the very
last minute and cabinet awaits its submission (Productivity Commission 2005:
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82). In recognising this situation, it is rare for the ORR to pursue the matter to
the ministerial level. Instead, its staff elect to work more informally with
departmental and ministerial office staff in an attempt to amend proposed
regulations identified as less than adequate. In this they have had some success.
In 2004-05, for example, the ORR was successful in 10 of 71 RIS cases, in
persuading departments to modify the preferred regulatory option contained in
their RIS (Productivity Commission 2005: 83). However, as RIS have the status
of cabinet submissions they are not, at least at the final, submission stage, released
for more public scrutiny, so little or no public pressure can be brought to bear
by this means on RIS that the ORR regard as inadequate (Productivity Commission
2005: 81).
Conclusion
In essence, the RIS was and continues to be a major attempt to improve the
quality of regulation with regard to business. As noted above, in practice its
performance has been variable and limited. Departments and agencies have
improved, if to varying extents, their performance with regard to meeting RIS
process requirements but they have been less successful with regard to improving
the content of new and amended regulation.
Finally, it has to be remembered that any system for policy-making in a
democracy, inevitably and continuously, will be subject to competing political
forces, from those desiring change for the benefits they hope it will bring, to
those who resist change, for fear the benefits that they currently receive will
diminish or be eliminated. Policy-making — whether or not it is referred to as
regulation-making — is an intensely political process and occurs in an arena in
which regulation-making is determined as much by the relative power of the
participants as by process and the quality of regulatory content. Efforts to
promote a greater degree of rationality, such as RIS, are to be welcomed for any
improvements in content and process performance they might bring but they
are not immune from the exercise of power in the policy process. This is the
central problem faced by RIS and its adherents. It is the reason that popularly
elected ministers will always vary in their degree of support for such a system,
for they are players in that process, acutely sensitive to its demands and
constraints. If they are not, they do not remain as ministers for any length of
time.
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The aim of this chapter is to describe and assess the development and use of the
system of regulatory performance indicators (RPI) by the Commonwealth
Government in the period 1998-2006. The RPI were designed to provide
decision-makers with standardised, system-wide data on the largely RIS-related
processes by which departments developed regulation with regard to business.
As such, they were early examples of a more general, international move to
improve regulatory quality and performance, in line with the urgings of the
OECD (see, for example, OECD 2004a; and 2004b).
The chapter concludes that the value and use of the RPI was limited, although
the experience gained should prove valuable in current attempts to improve
existing systems of performance indicators. The chapter is divided into three
parts and a conclusion. The first part describes the context in which the system
of RPIs was developed. The second identifies and discusses some of the major
design limitations of the final set of nine RPI that were developed. The third
assesses the performance of departments as indicated by the RPI, including an
assessment of the value of the RPI themselves.
Context: the RIS, the RPI and the nature of the RPI
challenge
The origins of the existing system of RPI in the Australian national government
can be found in two sources: firstly, in the more general concern to ensure
successful regulatory reform by improving and making more rigorous the
processes for formulating new or modified regulation; and secondly, in the
greater emphasis placed by Prime Minister Howard on the need to reduce the
regulatory burden on small business, a theme he stressed in the 1996 election
campaign (Howard 1997: iii). On gaining office a National Small Business Summit
was called, meeting in June, 2006. The summit endorsed a ‘Charter of Principles’,
in relation to the government regulation of business, endorsed by all levels of
government, with the tenth principle asserting that Australian governments
should develop a system of performance indicators to measure the efficiency of
their regulatory regimes (SBDTF 1996: 150).
A major outcome of the recommendations of the National Summit was the
establishment in 1996 of the Small Business Development Task Force (SBDTF)
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to review the ‘compliance and paper burden imposed on small business’. The
Task Force reported in November 1996 (SBDTF 1996: vii). The report referred
to RPI in three contexts: one, in relation to the need to establish a set of
performance indicators that would enable both the government and small
business to track Government’s performance in implementing the report’s
recommendations; two, in relation to the need for the development of a set of
benchmarked, nationally comparable performance indicators for regulation that
would enable more effective management of the growing regulatory burden by
providing accurate information; and three, related to the second, the need for
more detailed, varying sets of indicators at the departmental and agency level
(SBDTF 1996: 131-34, 148). The report recommended 10 performance indicators
relating to: transparency; accessibility; appropriateness; predictability; flexibility;
lower cost to business; administrative efficiency; fewer and simpler forms; better
instructions; reduction in perceived burden; and cultural change (SBDTF 1996:
131).
The Government’s response to the report was generally positive. In particular,
it agreed to one recommendation (number 62) that a national set of performance
indicators and benchmarking strategy should be developed (Howard 1997: vii,
81-82). It noted that a meeting of small business ministers and the Australian
Local Government Association already had agreed that the adoption of
appropriate performance indicators was crucial and that a working group of
officials would develop policy options for implementing comparable performance
indicators for consideration at the next Small Business Summit (Howard 1997:
82). In addition, it noted that the Commonwealth Government had stressed the
need for all departments and agencies to continue to develop ‘meaningful and
measurable’ performance indicators capable of demonstrating the following
properties:
• meeting essential regulatory objectives without unduly restricting business;
• regulatory decision-making processes are transparent and lead to fair
outcomes;
• consultations with industry and the public have been implemented that are
ongoing, accessible and responsive;
• information about the content of, and compliance with regulation is widely
available to, and understood by small business;
• new or revised regulation confers a net benefit on the community; and
• a predictable regulatory environment is created so business can make
decisions with some certainty (Howard 1997: 82).
While expressed rather differently, the latter six indicators covered all of the
areas recommended in the SBDF Report with two exceptions: the indicator
intended to measure the achievement of a ‘lower cost to business’; and, the
indicator for administrative efficiency. The Government noted only that there
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was a need for an indicator capable of demonstrating that new or revised
regulation would confer ‘a net benefit on the community’ without any mention
of reducing costs to business, although this could reasonably be inferred, given
the context of the Prime Minister’s message (Howard 1997: 82). It made no
mention of an indicator related to administrative efficiency and provided no
explanation as to why indicators for these two areas had been omitted.
While the members of the SBDF and their supporters inside and outside
government might well have been satisfied with their success in gaining
acceptance for the bulk of their recommendations there were, with the exception
of the ‘lower cost’ and administrative efficiency indicators, limitations and
significant challenges in what they had proposed and what the government
endorsed. Four stand out as of particular importance. The first, as noted above,
was the failure to specify an indicator in relation to business costs, although any
calculation of the net benefit to the community of regulation (see the fifth dot
point above), if sufficiently rigorous, would necessitate the calculation of business
costs as part of the calculation.
The second limitation was the neglect of any recommendations for indicators
that would enable departments, agencies and, ultimately, cabinet, to measure
the performance of existing business regulation in actually achieving its specified
objectives. This was in marked contrast to its very clear view that the existing
systems and processes for indicating the quality of new and modified regulation
needed improvement. The neglect may have been deliberate — an implicit
acknowledgement of the difficulties of such a task — but it was a limitation that
left the government (and, importantly, the working party of officials charged
with developing policy options as well as federal departments and agencies) free
from the explicit requirement to consider and recommend how such a system
might be developed and implemented. This was unfortunate for, in a parallel
development, departments at this time were increasingly being required to
introduce systems of output and outcome plans and budgets with associated
performance indicators, within which any desired RPI could have been embedded
(Department of Finance and Administration 1999; and 2007; Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet 2007).
The third limitation was the failure of the government, as noted above, to specify
indicators of administrative efficiency in relation to the implementation of
regulations. This may have been because it was realised that several systems
were already in place — or being put in place — and that these were regarded
as sufficiently informative. Examples included the annual parliamentary reviews
of departmental expenditures, the performance audits of the Australian National
Audit Office and departmental annual reports. The latter contained the
departments’ report of their performance against their outputs and outcomes,
using performance indicators specified in the PBS — but not the desired RPI —
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although there was nothing to prevent such indicators being developed and
used by departments. It is interesting that they have not included RPI because,
in conjunction with the PBS performance reports, they would have provided a
fuller picture of regulatory performance.
The fourth limitation was the SBDF’s failure to recommend that responsibility
for RPI at the ‘broad policy level’ be established under the control of the existing
Office of Regulation Review (the ORR). As the ORR was a unit in the influential
Productivity Commission — and located, therefore, within the broader
Department of the Treasury portfolio — this might have provided it with an
important source of power in relation to the design, implementation and use of
RPI.
In summary, while the move to develop a set of RPI that would enable the
comparison of regulatory performance across departments and agencies was a
marked step forward in the effort to improve regulatory quality, the relative
lack of focus on: the development of indicators for specific businesses compliance
costs; the achievement of regulatory objectives; administrative efficiency in
implementing regulations; and an appropriate organisational location, suggested
that any resulting RPI system would be less than optimal.
Design limitations of the RPI system: regulatory coverage,
integration and type of RPI
In the course of 1997-98 two Government commissioned studies of performance
indicators were undertaken. The first was by the government’s then Industry
Commission (now the Productivity Commission). Because the study was not
established to provide information and recommendations for the government
in relation to the recommendations of the Bell Report, its terms of reference
confined it to the examination of national and comparative performance indicators
for local government. The origins of the study, in fact, predated the Bell Report
and it did not include indicators for State and Territory governments except
insofar as the latter used indicators with regard to local government performance.
The report’s conclusion was that a consistent, national approach to performance
measurement for local government was not ‘warranted’, at that time (Industry
Commission 1997a: vii). It did, however, note that further discussion might, in
time, lead to ‘nationally consistent’ approaches (Industry Commission 1997a:
vii). This must have been a disappointment for the government — given the
Prime Minister’s wish that such indicators be developed — however, it had
neither the constitutional or statutory authority to impose its will on either the
state or local governments (Howard 1997).
The second study was organised through the Office of Small Business (the OSB),
located in the Department of Industry Tourism and Resources. The OSB worked
with line departments and the ORR to develop a set of nine RPIs for the Federal
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Government (DITR 2006: 2). Not only was the task intrinsically difficult, there
were also contentious issues in relation to the specific objectives of the exercise,
such as: the number and type of indicators that should be developed; the
potential for overlap with other indicators; the extent to which indicators should
be incorporated within a modified RIS process; and, which organisation should
be responsible for the indicators. Nevertheless, a set of nine RPI was developed
and agreed to by the government. These were designed to provide performance
information in relation to the six objectives specified by the Prime Minister
(Howard 1997: 82):
• to ensure that all new or revised regulation confers a net benefit on the
community;
• to achieve essential regulatory objectives without unduly restricting business
in the way in which these objectives are achieved;
• to ensure that the regulatory decision-making processes are transparent and
lead to fair outcomes;
• to ensure that information and details on regulation and how to comply with
it are accessible and understood by business;
• to create a predictable regulatory environment so business can make decisions
with some surety of future environment; and
• to ensure that consultation processes are accessible and responsive to business
and the community (DITR 2006: 3-4).
As with the Prime Minister’s 1997 statement, this final set of RPI did not contain
a specific indicator intended to measure the achievement of a ‘lower cost to
business’ (although this might be estimated from the calculation as to net benefit
to the community), or an indicator for administrative efficiency.
The promised study of comparable performance indicators for state and territory
governments did not eventuate at this time and no formal explanation has been
found by the author for this omission, other than the conclusions of the
Productivity Commission report noted above. Officers interviewed indicated
that it might have ‘fallen between the cracks’. It is worth noting that, in 2006,
following the government’s acceptance of the Banks Report, the Productivity
Commission was directed to undertake a study of performance benchmarking
for business regulation (Productivity Commission 2006).
Coverage of the indicators
The coverage of the RPI was to be limited to new or modified primary, secondary
or quasi-regulation related directly or indirectly to business and that would
have a significant impact on business but excluding tax regulation. While this
seemed to neglect both the very large stock of existing regulation and the
importance of tax regulation — a matter of some concern for all businesses —
this was not entirely the case, for all of the Australian governments had agreed
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to review existing regulation impacting on competition as part of the National
Competition Policy review process (Carroll 2006b; Harman 1996). In relation to
the exclusion of tax regulation the argument was that public consultation on
new or modified taxation measures could be used by taxpayers to avoid or
minimise their tax obligations. It was also argued, less convincingly, that it was
difficult to assess the impact of specific tax measures in isolation from their
implications for the overall tax system (Industry Commission 1997b: 32). The
fact that public consultation on new or modified taxes, especially where they
might increase the overall tax burden, tends to have negative electoral impacts
was not noted, at least in government publications.
The coverage of the RPI was further restricted by applying them only to
regulation that was subject to the RIS process managed by the ORR in the year
in question (DITR 2006: 4). The RIS process, in turn, excluded regulation of a
minor or ‘machinery’, nature and involved only regulation for which the Federal
Government or the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) was responsible,
excluding state, territory and local government regulation. The decision to
exclude minor and machinery changes in regulation, largely on the grounds of
the high administrative costs of reviewing all such regulation, was understandable
from the perspective of both the departments and the ORR. However, the
exclusion meant that it would not be possible to assess the cost of the cumulative
regulatory burden on business — a question of considerable concern for
individual businesses and peak associations.
While the considerable restrictions on the coverage of RPI may seem somewhat
unreasonable, they were intended to focus the attention of those monitoring
and reviewing regulatory performance on performance that was deviating,
positively or negatively, from regulatory objectives at an aggregate,
whole-of-department or whole-of-government level. They were not intended to
provide detailed information about regulatory performance at the level of specific
regulations, which should be provided, more appropriately, by detailed indicators
at the departmental level. As noted above, departments were being encouraged
to either introduce, or to improve such detailed indicators at this time in relation
to the PBS. While not the topic of this chapter, it should be noted that
departments have, in practice, developed and incorporated very few specific
RPI within their PBS reports.
An integrated set of regulatory performance indicators
It is clear is that the new system of RPI was not put in place as part of a
comprehensive system for measuring regulatory performance. Rather, they were
one element in a loosely coordinated set of changes introduced over a period of
several years from the later 1990s. The other major changes were: a requirement
for annual regulatory plans (the OSB 2003), an improved and somewhat better
resourced RIS system (Productivity Commission 1998: 27-8) and the PBS noted
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above (Department of Finance and Administration 1999). The danger in such a
situation is that the information provided by RPI might be considered in isolation
from other performance indicators, thereby reducing their value to senior
decision-makers, rather than being an important part of an integrated set of
indicators enabling more systematic assessments and appropriate, timely, remedial
action in relation to regulatory performance. The probability of this occurring
was increased with the decision to divide responsibility for the various reform
elements among several departments and agencies. Annual regulatory plans
were to be developed by departments although, initially, these would be
coordinated by the OSB. The annual PBS to be developed by departments, would
include appropriate indicators to be reported on in their annual reports. The
strengthened RIS was to remain with the ORR. Overall responsibility for the RPI
was given to the Office of Small Business, although responsibility for collecting,
monitoring and assessing relevant data was split between the ORR (with regard
to RPIs 1, 2, 3, 8) and the OSB (RPIs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9), with the ORR providing relevant
data to the OSB for collation into an annual report on the RPIs (DITR 2006: 3).
The decision to allocate responsibility for PBS outputs, outcomes and indicators
to the departments could hardly have been otherwise, given the extent of the
planning task involved and the need for a detailed knowledge of the relevant
regulation. However, the decision to split responsibility for RPI between the
OSB and the ORR was questionable. On the one hand the ORR was collecting
relevant performance data as part of its established RIS process, so it would be
inefficient for that to be replicated by the OSB. On the other hand, splitting
responsibility for parts of the process increased coordination costs and, possibly,
would introduce a degree of friction between the two agencies involved.
However, given that the development of RPIs had commenced within the context
of small business policy and pressures from small business, it might have been
felt that it was politically appropriate to vest at least partial carriage of
responsibility for the reform of regulatory systems with the Department of
Industry — the department with responsibility for small business policy at the
federal level. It is instructive to note that, following a further review of business
regulation in 2006, responsibility for RPI was moved from the OSB to a
reorganised and renamed ORR, in the shape of the Office of Best Practice
Regulation.
The types of RPI
RPI fall into a variety of types, addressing various stages or dimensions of the
regulatory process, such as those related to input, process, content, output and
outcome. Some indicators provide information about more than one stage, as
with RPI 3 and 4 in Table 3.1. The nine RPI put in place were, as Table 1
indicates, very much focused on process, with none directly addressing input,
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content or outcome and only two addressing output, so that they provided no
direct information as to whether or not a regulation was achieving its objectives.
The nine RPIs were defined as follows:
• RPI 1: the proportion of regulations for which the RIS documentation
‘adequately addressed net benefit to the community’;
• RPI 2: the proportion of regulations for which the RIS adequately justified
the compliance burden on business;
• RPI 3: the proportion of regulations which provide businesses and
stakeholders with some appropriate flexibility to determine the most cost
effective means of achieving regulatory objectives;
• RPI 4: the proportion of cases in which external review of decisions led to
a decision being reversed or overturned;
• RPI 5: the proportion of regulatory agencies whose mechanisms for internal
review of decisions meet prescribed standards for complaints handling;
• RPI 6: the proportion of regulatory agencies having communications strategies
for regulation, or formal consultative channels for communicating information
about regulation;
• RPI 7: the proportion of regulatory agencies publishing an adequate forward
plan for introduction and review of regulation;
• RPI 8: the proportion of regulations for which the RIS documentation
included an adequate statement of consultation; and
• RPI 9: the proportion of regulatory agencies with organisational guidelines
outlining consultation processes, procedures and standards.
The lack of outcome-focused indicators is understandable, as it is an inherently
difficult task, as the voluminous literature on policy evaluation demonstrates.
Also, the primary intent of the reformers at this stage was to improve the quality
of the processes involved in making regulation impacting on business, based on
the assumption that good regulation-making processes will tend to result in more
effective regulation — although they were well aware that good processes did
not necessarily lead to good regulation. In retrospect, it is disappointing that
the opportunity was not taken to develop at least some outcome indicators, or
to at least commence planning for their development. At the least it suggests
that, at the time, departments either did not have performance data about
regulatory outputs and outcomes, or, if they did possess such data, that it could
not be aggregated in a meaningful fashion to provide useful performance
information — or, more cynically, that they were fearful that their regulatory
performance would be disappointing. Yet, as noted above, the introduction of
the PBS system in the same period as the development and introduction of the
RPI — with the former’s requirement that departments introduce clearly defined
outputs, outcomes and related performance indicators, linked to planned and
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actual expenditures — provided just such an opportunity to develop useful
output and outcome indicators.












The RPI — performance and practice
In this section the aim is to provide an assessment of the RPI in practice, covering
the period from 1998 to 2006. It is divided into a number of sub-sections each
of which focuses on one or more of the RPI in relation to the objective in question.
Objective 1: to ensure that all new or revised regulation
confers a net benefit on the community
Progress in relation to this objective was measured by RPI 1, the proportion of
regulations for which the RIS documentation ‘adequately addressed net benefit
to the community’. The assessment of the adequacy with which a regulation’s
net benefit was calculated was the responsibility of the ORR, which then
submitted it to the OSB for inclusion in its annual report on RPI. Over the period
1998-99 to 2004-05, the average annual percentage score for all departments and
agencies for RPI 1 was 88% , with a range from 81% to 92% (see Table 3.2). It
should be noted that the ORR increased the rigour with which it assessed
performance over the period, as departments gained familiarity with the RPI,
so that it is not possible to compare year to year performance with any degree
of precision, although, where the annual performance increased year by year,
despite the increased rigour of the assessments, then performance is likely to
have increased.
The use of the phrase ‘adequately addressed net benefit’ in RPI 1, was a clear
indication that its designers were well aware of the substantial difficulties
involved in costing the likely or actual impact of a regulation. The phrase implies,
for example, that cost benefit analysis will be the means for calculating net
benefits but it does not specify or require that this must be the case, leaving
considerable discretion in the hands of those submitting a proposed regulation
to the RIS process. In addition, the use of the word ‘adequate’, rather than more
specific criteria for the assessment of net benefit, enables a wide range of
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calculations of net benefit, more or less precise, to be judged as ‘adequate’. While
this might have been realistic, it meant that the value of this measure was
distinctly limited for those concerned to see if regulations were likely to achieve
a net benefit to the community. It was of somewhat more use for indicating
broad trends over time, especially combined with the increasing rigour of the
ORR’s assessments. Unfortunately, as indicated in Table 3.2, performance as
measured by RPI 2 fell somewhat over the period, suggesting that there was no
significant improvement in the estimates of net benefit incorporated in the RIS
assessed by the ORR.
Table 3.2 Aggregate RPI scores for all agencies, 1998-2005











Source: the OSB Annual Reports 1998-99 to 2004-05
In practice, the ORR in its publication A Guide to Regulation, did specify the
type of costs and benefits to be included by departments in their RIS
documentation. It noted that there were considerable difficulties in gaining
precise, quantitative estimates of costs and benefits but encouraged departments
to at least identify and, where possible, assess the fullest range of costs and
benefits, although admitting that quantification was not always possible or
necessary — although the onus of proof was on the department to defend the
lack of quantification (the ORR 1998: D10).
Hence, it was quite possible that the ORR might judge the calculation of net
benefit in an RIS as ‘adequate’, even where little or no quantitative data or
assessment was included. If those relying on such performance data were aware
of such limitations, it could be argued that at least it gave a rather crude, largely
qualitative indicator of some value, although the lack of an upward trend in
performance over the period was disappointing. However, even this limited
value has to be questioned as, in practice, what was reported in the annual OSB
report was only that proportion of a department’s regulations judged as
‘adequate’ in the year in question, in the form of a simple percentage figure, for
example, 75%, with very little further explanation or clarification. Further,
given that in any one year a department might have submitted only one or two
RIS, then the value of providing a percentage indicator as a measure of
performance was of questionable value for senior decision-makers and, of course,
for Parliament, business and the community.
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Objective 2: to achieve essential regulatory objectives
without unduly restricting business in the way in which
these objectives are achieved
Objective 2 was measured by two indicators, RPI 2 — the proportion of
regulations for which the RIS adequately justified the compliance burden on
business — and RPI 3 — the proportion of regulations which provide businesses
and stakeholders with some appropriate flexibility to determine the most cost
effective means of achieving regulatory objectives — both to be monitored by
the ORR. Over the period 1998-99 to 2004-05, the average annual percentage
score for all departments and agencies for RPI 2 was 90%, with a range of 81%
to 94%, and for RPI 3 was 75%, with a very large range of 39% to 100%. While
the average of 90% for RPI 2 might have been reassuring, in the three years
previous there was an increased variation with regard to the annual performance,
to a low of 81% in 2004-05, which was of concern. In contrast, performance in
relation to RPI 3 increased dramatically over the period, even with the increase
in the rigour of the ORR’s assessments. Unfortunately the OSB annual reports
provide no indication as to why performance improved (or fell), for any of the
indicators.
If, as indicated above, it was difficult to provide accurate estimates of the costs
and benefits of proposed regulation, then RPI 2 at least required departments
to provide clear, logical arguments to support their proposals and (perhaps) to
think through the compliance implications for business. If backed up by accurate,
quantitative estimates of compliance costs and benefits, so much the better. In
practice, its value, as with RPI 1, was limited by the lack of specific criteria
against which adequacy would be judged (although the ORR did provide advice
to departments in this regard) and the lack of quantitative estimates provided
in practice by departments. As the ORR’s annual reports very clearly indicate,
departmental estimates of regulatory costs and benefits were often unsatisfactory.
Indeed, the Chairman of the Productivity Commission (of which the ORR is a
unit), Gary Banks, indicated that in 2004 only 20% of tabled RISs contained
even an attempt at quantifying the costs related to proposed regulations (Banks
2005: 10). If Banks was correct in his estimate, then it is difficult to see how, for
example, 82% of all regulations assessed in 2004-05 could be assessed as adequate
in relation to RPI 1 and 81% in relation to RPI 2 despite the fact that 20% of all
RIS did not even attempt to quantify the costs related to the proposed regulations
(the OSB 2006:38). It suggests a very flexible interpretation as to the meaning
of adequacy and, importantly, makes the value of both RPI very questionable
as reliable measures of regulatory performance.
RPI 3 was based on whether or not a department’s RIS contained any one or
more of the following measures:
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• a performance or outcome based standard which did not prescribe how a
business was to comply with the standard;
• provision for a business to seek acceptance of an alternative mechanism for
achieving compliance than that prescribed in the regulation;
• the use of a market-based mechanism such as tradeable permits to allow
businesses flexibility in determining a compliance strategy; and
• offered a range of means for businesses to have flexibility in deciding what
steps to take in compliance (Department of Industry Tourism and Resources
2006: 14).
While the intent of RPI 3 is clear — being a measure of the degree of flexibility
that a proposed regulation allows businesses in their compliance with regulation
— the assumption it contains of the attractiveness of regulatory flexibility to
business is problematical. A small business, for example, has limited resources
of both money and time. Hence, the use of those resources to determine how it
should comply with a regulatory performance or outcome based standard, rather
than simply complying in a way prescribed in a regulation, is not necessarily
attractive. At the least, it requires the business to design an appropriate strategy,
or to purchase a ready-made strategy, or to employ a consultant to design the
strategy. Faced with such choices, how many small businesses would not welcome
a helpful regulatory prescription as to the required strategy, assuming the
prescription is cost effective and meets compliance needs?
In summary, RPI 2 and 3 provided a rather mixed message for decision-makers,
suggesting that regulations were providing an increase in the flexibility with
which businesses could comply with regulations but, worryingly, a decline in
the extent to which departments provided an adequate justification for the
regulations in question. When the trend for RPI 2 is combined with the
downward trend in RPI 1 — performance related to the calculation of net benefits
— it suggests, if rather speculatively, that the efforts of the ORR and the OSB
to encourage departments to improve regulatory quality in these important
dimensions was unsuccessful, despite their increased efforts owing to a boost
to their resources following the Bell Report.
Objective 3: to ensure that the regulatory decision-making
processes are transparent and lead to fair outcomes
This was to be measured by RPI 4 — the proportion of cases in which external
review of decisions (as defined) led to a decision being reversed or overturned
— and RPI 5 — the proportion of regulatory agencies whose mechanisms for
internal review of decisions meet standards for complaints handling outlined in
‘Principles for Developing a Service Charter’ published by the Department of
Finance and Administration. Departments and agencies were to provide the
relevant information to the OSB for inclusion in its annual report. Over the period
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1998-999 to 2004-05, the average annual percentage score for all departments
and agencies for RPI 4 was 59%, with a range from 31% to 70%, but a declining
trend from 2002-03. This was a disturbingly poor level of performance. The
average annual score for RPI 5 was 68%, with a range from 50% to 77%, with
a slight upwards trend in the latter three years, following an initial and very
sharp fall in performance. In the case of RPI 5, where departments had only to
meet the standards for complaints handling quite clearly specified by the
Department of Finance and Administration, the average score of 68% was
surprisingly low.
Unlike RPI 1 to 3, RPI 4 focused attention on the performance of departments
in administering regulations. In particular, departments were assessed on their
adherence to due process rather than administrative efficiency. The assumption
was that if the proportion of cases where a decision was reversed or overturned
by an external body was low, then the quality of the decision process, at least
with regard to due process, was relatively high. While there is no doubt that
RPI 4 might provide a valuable, more objective indicator of due process
performance, two limitations need to be considered: one, limitations as to the
sources of external decisions to be considered and reported upon; two, small
business resource limitations.
With regard to the sources of external decisions to be included, the formal advice
to departments was that they should only consider decisions of external review
agencies that were empowered to overturn or reverse the department’s decision
(Department of Industry Tourism and Resources 2006: 7-8). This meant that, for
example, complaints from businesses to the Commonwealth Ombudsman would
not be considered, even if the Ombudsman supported the complaint, as the
Ombudsman had no power to overturn or reverse decisions. In addition, decisions
resulting from departments’ internal review processes were excluded, even if
they supported the complainant. In this latter case, while a degree of concern
as to the objectivity of reviews from internal review sources is not surprising,
it is surprising that they were not to be considered, even, for example, where
they might have led to the overturning of an earlier decision. If they had been
included as a source of performance data, this might have encouraged
departments to adopt internal review processes where they did not exist and,
where they did exist and indicated poor levels of performance, to improve their
procedures and related decisions, especially if such information was made public
in the RPI reports.
The second limitation springs from the limited resources small businesses have
to take complaints about regulation and its implementation to external review
bodies such as the courts or the Administrative Review Tribunal. Faced with
this reality, the decision to exclude from consideration those decisions overturned
within the potentially less costly and less formal internal review processes of
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departments was unduly restrictive. In part, the impact of this restriction might
have been mitigated by RPI 5, the proportion of regulatory agencies whose
mechanisms for internal review of decisions met standards for complaints
handling outlined in the Principles for Developing a Service Charter. Some 12
criteria had to be satisfied in order to meet these standards, as determined by
the Department of Finance and Administration (Department of Industry Tourism
and Resources 2006: 8-9). The assumption was that if a department’s processes
satisfied these criteria then it was likely that its internal processes were at least
adequate insofar as complainants were concerned. Thus, departments were
required only to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ with regard to RPI 5 and to provide a brief
description of their internal review processes in their first report but not
thereafter. It hardly needs pointing out that having sound processes does not
guarantee good decisions and, given that the average annual score for all
departments for the whole period for RPI 5 was only 68% (on a self-declared
basis) then there is room for legitimate concern as to the adequacy of departmental
performance in ensuring transparency or fair outcomes — the very objective
measured by RPI 4 and 5.
Objective 4: to ensure that information and details on
regulation and how to comply with it are accessible and
understood by business
This was to be measured by RPI 6 — the proportion of regulatory agencies
having communications strategies for regulation, or formal consultative channels
for communicating information about regulation. Over the period 1998-99 to
2004-05 the average annual percentage score for all departments and agencies
for RPI 6 was 95%, with an initially impressive performance falling away
somewhat after 2001-02.
Departments and agencies provided: a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question
of whether they had communication strategies or formal consultative channels;
a brief description of the strategy or channels in question; and, where the
department had a formal, written strategy, a copy of that document was
submitted to the OSB. Where such strategies existed but had not been in place
for the full reporting period, departments were advised to answer ‘yes’ to the
question (Department of Industry Tourism and Resources 2006: 11). In practice,
there seems to have been no little or no checking by either the ORR or the OSB
as to whether the strategies or consultative channels actually enabled businesses
to access and understand information on regulations other than as demonstrated
in relation to RPI 8 and 9, below. In other words the value of RPI 6 was limited,
focusing only on the achievement of procedural targets rather than any
assessment of whether or not businesses found the consultative channels
accessible or the information provided about regulations understandable.
However, assuming that adequate processes might encourage accessibility and
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understanding, then an average performance level of 95% for the period was
reassuring, even with the slight downward trend after 2001-02.
Objective 5: to create a predictable regulatory environment
so business can make decisions with some surety of future
environment
This was to be measured by RPI 7, the proportion of regulatory agencies
publishing an adequate forward plan for introduction and review of regulation.
Departments and agencies were to provide the relevant information to the OSB
for inclusion in its annual report. Over the period 1998-99 to 2004-05, the average
annual percentage score for all departments and agencies for RPI 7 was only
60%, with a range from 27% to 78%, although some reassurance could be gained
from the consistently upward trend in performance after 2001-02. In other words,
assuming that this RPI did provide a reliable indicator as to the ‘surety of future
environment’, there was a substantial lack of surety for those businesses affected
by the 40% of regulatory agencies that did not publish an adequate forward
plan in the period under consideration. In addition, the extent to which such a
predictable regulatory environment can be anticipated on the basis of a business
knowing that a regulatory review is planned, is questionable, given that the
planned reviews could result in substantial change, with at least short term
uncertainty.
Objective 6: to ensure that consultation processes are
accessible and responsive to business and the community
This was to be measured by RPI 8, the proportion of regulations for which the
RIS documentation included an adequate statement of consultation (to be
monitored and assessed by the ORR) and RPI 9, the proportion of regulatory
agencies with organisational guidelines outlining consultation processes,
procedures and standards, with departments and agencies to provide the relevant
information to the OSB for inclusion in its annual report. In part, RPI 8 and 9
overlap with RPI 4, above, providing additional information as to the adequacy
of consultation processes, based on the assessment by the ORR of the
documentation provided in the RIS process. Over the period 1998-99 to 2004-05,
the average annual percentage score for all departments and agencies for RPI 8
was 91%, with a range from 82% to 96%, but a worrying, downward trend
from 2001-02, to a figure of 82% in 2004-05. The average annual score for RPI
9 was only 62%, with a range from 48% to 74% and a downward trend after
2001-02. Again, RPI 8 and 9 provide performance information only in relation
to departmental processes, not their actual impact on business, that is, whether
they actually result in accessibility and responsiveness. Hence, given that the
average level of process performance for RPI 9 was only 62%, one might speculate
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that the actual accessibility and responsiveness of consultation processes used
by departments was of a rather low order, both for business and the community.
Conclusion
In summary, the performance information provided by the nine RPI for the
period under consideration was certainly interesting, of varying degrees of value
and, for RPI 3 and 7, showed improving regulatory performance by departments
and agencies. The other RPI, however, suggested that regulatory performance
in relation to process was at best variable and as indicated for several RPI, in a
downward trend. Combined with the coverage and design limitations noted
above, they indicate that the Australian system of RPI, while a step forward,
was of limited value. Perhaps of most concern for proponents of regulatory
reform, its limited success suggested that the decades-long effort to improve the
international competitiveness of the Australian economy by improving the
capacity of regulation-making processes to reject anti-competitive, regulatory
proposals, had been of only very limited success.
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Chapter 4. The mirage of rail reform:




The title of this chapter is somewhat provocative and is intended to focus
attention on the question of whether or not regulatory reform in Australia is
only about cutting red tape and achieving national consistency. My experience
as a state government official for some 15 years, in both line and central agencies,
suggests that there exists a dominant view that regulatory reform will only
deliver value when it is about achieving simplicity and consistency. This appears
to be the orthodox view across all governments at both Commonwealth and state
levels. There is, of course, considerable value in creating regulatory environments
that are simple and easy to follow for all participants. In a federal structure, for
example, where inter-jurisdictional transactions and cross border services operate,
treating these activities in a consistent manner makes sense for the organisations
and individuals concerned. However, one of the keys for successfully managing
organisations within the modern world is about building the capacity to operate
and work within complex regulatory systems. As Quiggin (2006) claims,
innovation and diversity are more enduring than neat and tidy arrangements
based on uniformity and simplicity. If we are to achieve the capacity to operate
complex systems then we need systems that enable organisations to effectively
operate within those diverse and complex regulatory environments.
The argument that follows is similar to the position put forward by Twomey
and Withers in their recent paper on Australian federalism (2007). They argue
that reform efforts should focus on working within our system of governance
to improve our capacity to reallocate roles and responsibilities and improve
mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation. Their argument suggests that
rather than work only to reduce complicated arrangements and diversity,
governments should also work to harness the benefits of federalism. This will
result, they argue, in more flexible and responsive government, promoting
innovation and efficiency through competition (Twomey and Withers 2007:6).
The chapter is divided into six sections, followed by a conclusion. The first
examines what is meant by expanding the regulatory reform process to include
building regulatory capacity across policy sectors. The second looks at the
increasing trend to a centralisation of decision-making in Australia’s federal
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system. The third analyses some of the negative impacts associated with the use
of targets as a means for regulatory reform. The fourth and fifth sections,
following Steane and Carroll, suggest that, in practice, regulatory systems
necessarily are becoming more complex, not less, despite the waves of regulatory
reform that have occurred. The sixth section examines the case of the National
Transport Commission (NTC) in relation to regulatory reform in land transport.
Regulatory reform and capacity building
Regulatory systems involve two key elements, the process of regulation-making
and the instruments and approaches required for compliance and enforcement
(Doern 2003). Recent Australian debate on regulatory reform (Regulation
Taskforce 2006) has predominately focussed on the second component with the
objective of simplifying instruments of enforcement, for example, proposing a
movement from traditional, prescriptive regulation, to various models of industry
self regulation. It also stresses the need to streamline regulatory systems by, for
example, removing duplication of effort across levels of government and
achieving regulatory uniformity. In summary, the key demands from industry
and governments have been that we need to reduce the level of regulation and
simplify what remains.
There is no doubt pressure needs to be maintained to ensure regulatory systems
are responsive and adaptive to change. Regulatory frameworks need to be under
constant review in order to ensure unnecessary regulation is removed and where
appropriate more innovative and responsive mechanisms introduced. However,
policy makers also need to monitor, evaluate and improve how participants in
a regulatory sector function within complex systems. In particular, the central
agencies of government have an important role to play in assessing whether the
institutional arrangements and regulatory mechanisms within particular policy
sectors facilitate and develop the capacity of businesses, non government
organisations and key public sector agencies to participate in the policy-making
process and achieve higher levels of regulatory compliance.
In a globalised world markets are becoming more complex and interdependent.
Local standards, rules and operating procedures are increasingly influenced by
national and international forces that aim to more seamlessly integrate the efficient
movement of goods and services across national boundaries, free from
unnecessary and varying, regulatory requirements. The result is a proliferation
of international trade agreements and the increasing development of international
standards, accompanied, at the national level by processes of mutual recognition,
harmonisation and the adoption of Australian Standards aimed at regulatory
simplification.
There is also mounting pressure to further integrate and build relationships
across related systems. Those responsible for the regulation of the freight rail
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sector, for example, now take a stronger interest in how its operations interface
with road and sea transport systems. As COAG notes: ‘More flexible rules
governing access to the road network should be established that will allow
freight carried by rail to be seamlessly picked up and dropped off by road
transport operations.’ (COAG 2006: Appendix C:14). The result is increasing
regulatory harmonisation, as well as an increasing harmonisation of, for example,
communication systems across transport modes, such as standardised electronic
tracking systems for containers and goods. These systems are then ‘overlayed’,
by other regulatory regimes such as those related to OH&S and the environment.
In terms of Doern’s analysis of regulatory regimes (2003), we see sectoral
regulatory issues specific to rail interacting with broader ‘horizontal’ framework
regulatory regimes that are universally applied across a range of policy fields.
This interaction of regulation, standards and rules that have both specific and
universal impact on policy sectors adds to the complexity of policy, building a
layered regulatory framework into the system of governance.
It is this constantly changing and overlapping nature of regulatory systems that
suggests that the debate on regulatory reform should be expanded to include
strategies that enhance the capacity of agencies and stakeholders to better manage
and respond to this increasing regulatory complexity. This is an issue of genuine
concern for line agencies heavily involved in regulation, where the dominant
discourse focuses on reducing the burden of red tape and the causes of
over-regulation but neglects the need to build and improve the capacity to cope
with regulatory complexity. The issue of building capacity to manage and operate
within a diverse and ever changing regulatory environment has received little
attention from central agencies and COAG. In their discourse, regulation is still
regarded with some suspicion and efforts to promote a positive agenda of working
with regulation are less likely to be vigorously supported (McConkey and Dutil
2006). What is necessary is the introduction into Australian jurisdictions of
‘Capability Reviews’, similar to those being undertaken of key government
departments in the United Kingdom (Cabinet Office 2006). These reviews examine
current and future demands on departments and look at their capacity to manage
and respond to changing circumstances and demands. The reviews are focussed
on future needs and examine how customers and stakeholders are engaged in
the design and management of service delivery and the related regulatory models.
An examination of regulatory capability might also involve extending the
assessment of an agency’s capability to include an assessment of the overall
capacity of the sector. Such a review would look at the constraints or barriers
for key participants (public and private) to successfully engage and comply with
regulatory arrangements that govern behaviour and the rules of operation and
engagement.
Many commentators have observed an incremental centralisation of regulatory
reform agendas over recent years (Quiggin 2006; Patty 2006). The recent High
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Court decision on Commonwealth powers in respect to industrial relations saw
a flurry of commentary expressing concern with the growing centralisation of
Commonwealth power and the need to reform the federation (Debus 2006; Lynch
2006; Dick 2006). Twomey and Withers (2007) present a comprehensive argument
as to what they regard as the negative economic and social consequences of such
centralisation of power in the Australian federation. A key theme is their concern
with what they see as a growing Commonwealth interest in the detail of policy,
an area that has traditionally been managed by states. This is a process Twomey
and Withers refer to as ‘opportunistic federalism’ (2007: 5) and is evident in the
shifting of COAG’s interest from system wide issues of institutional arrangements
to more specific reform targets that shape the rules and patterns of interaction
on matters of detail in various policy sectors. In this context, the Commonwealth,
drawing on its authority and financial strength, has shaped the COAG agenda
to reflect its increasingly centralised, political and policy interests (Twomey and
Withers 2007). COAG’s focus on detail seems to have distracted it from the more
strategic issue of how regulatory institutions and processes of governance
influence the operational capacity and compliance levels of stakeholders and
participants in key policy sectors.
In land transport, as in other sectors, there exist well established systems for
handling the detailed matters of inter-jurisdictional coordination and cooperation,
such as Ministerial Councils and their supporting forums of chief executives
from government agencies. In the late 1980s and early 1990s pressure for
microeconomic reform saw heads of government become increasingly involved
in steering inter-jurisdictional reform agendas in several key policy sectors. In
land transport, for example, central agencies and, ultimately, COAG, took a
strong lead in shaping institutional arrangements for regulatory reform, leading
to the 1991 Intergovernmental Agreement that established the National Road
Transport Commission (NRTC) (Painter 1998). However, what is important to
note is that while central agencies were critical in pushing the establishment of
the NRTC, they did not shape the details of the reform agenda and resulting
work. This arose out of the detailed work and proposals of the various road and
transport agencies (Wilson and Moore 2006). The success of the NRTC as a model
for progressing regulatory reform was acknowledged in 2004 when its mandate
was expanded to include rail and it was renamed the National Transport
Commission (NTC).
However, in 2006, COAG once again became involved in land transport reform
but this time announcing a far more detailed approach to reform with a set of
specific targets and timelines. In particular, it requested the simplification of
rail safety regulation by December 2006, with a program of work specifically
targeting accreditation guidelines, safety management system requirements,
disclosure of information and the management of fatigue amongst rail workers
(NTC 2006). This recent interest by heads of government in the operational detail
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of policy represents a shift from the 1991 approach, where the focus was on
developing appropriate institutions and accompanying frameworks for
progressing reform, not operational detail. It also continues to neglect the
question of improving our regulatory capacity to deal with complex systems.
The problem with targets in complex systems
A significant risk in setting a program of reform with specified targets, such as
that proposed by COAG for rail safety regulation, is that it focuses agency interest
on delivering a ‘one-off’, result at one point in time rather than in creating
incentives for embedding ongoing processes of quality improvement and review.
For example, achieving national consistency in the regulation of rail sidings by
December 2006, for inclusion in a report to COAG, tends to focus activity on
reaching uniformity rather than any real assessment of the best approach for
regulating the access and safety management systems of such facilities. The
challenge of revising existing operational systems and practices within set
timeframes means that jurisdictions tend to add each other’s requirements
together to build a common national approach rather than review practices down
to the minimum most effective requirement. National targets tend to result in
the mere ‘compilation’, of practices rather than a rigorous identification of the
most effective and efficient approach. It suggests that we have stable, static,
regulatory and operational systems that can be reduced to a set of simple
regulatory requirements. Specifying targets also tends to lead to the neglect of
areas not included on the list of targets for reform and action. Rather, reform
efforts should acknowledge the dynamic nature of the regulatory process and
the complexity of systems and also focus on means to enable participants to more
effectively deal with and manage that complexity. An unwarranted assumption
that simplicity can be achieved distracts from the need to develop an
understanding of the processes of regulatory transformation that are currently
underway across many policy sectors.
The case of rail freight is an illustrative example. The microeconomic reform
efforts of governments during the 1980s and 1990s saw rail systems undergo
massive transformations. Independent, localised networks that were government
owned and integrated both vertically and horizontally within states were
transformed into a more complex set of arrangements of public, corporatised
and privatised operations (Productivity Commission 1999:92). The transformation
of railways from single, state owned entities in the 1990s to a multi-organisational
arena with both public and private participants, subject to independent
regulatory oversight, clearly demonstrates the growing diversity and complexity
of policy sectors, even though the initial reform aim may have been to gain
greater harmonisation and regulatory simplicity. The result is that the shaping
of public policy in relation to railways has become a much more complicated,
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multilayered process for organisations and individuals, managers and politicians,
as suggested by Steane and Carroll (2001).
Out of this process of change two key outcomes can be observed. Firstly, a
growing desire amongst some participants and observers to simplify
arrangements, including further regulatory reform. The increased complexity
in railway systems brought about, at least in part, by the wave of reforms in the
1990s, is now seen by some as a cost to business and a potential constraint on
operational efficiency (Regulation Taskforce 2006). Second, the process of making
and modifying regulation has become more porous and complex, with a broader
range of public and private participants gaining access to and varying degrees
of influence upon, policy networks and forums. This is evident, for example, in
relation to COAG, where a wider range of economic interests has entered the
regulatory reform debate, bringing pressure to bear as to the need to engage in
detailed reform of rail safety regulation. Nor is this phenomenon confined to
Australia. Doern (2006), for example, suggests that in federal systems operating
with multiple levels of governance there is evidence of increasing pressure to
merge, collapse or rationalise previously separate levels of regulation. He argues
that this tendency is mainly driven by business interests promoting a neo-liberal
agenda primarily concerned with economic productivity. It is ironic that those
interests are now calling for freer markets, smaller government and regulatory
simplicity, when it was, in large part, similar calls for microeconomic reform
that resulted in the break up, privatisation and expansion of regulation in the
Australian rail sector in the 1990s.
The growing complexity of regulation and policy sectors
A key observation of the Regulation Taskforce was that there had been a
proliferation of regulatory agencies across all levels of government. It argued
that these agencies, along with their excessive regulatory output, have added
further layers to the policy process and increased the complexity of regulation
(Banks 2005; Regulation Taskforce 2006). The OECD (2002) has made similar
observations and argues that governments now need to work to simplify
regulatory systems. This is an increased focus on the quality and value of
regulation and ‘whether the legitimate policy goals underlying the regulation
can be achieved in a way that does not impose as high a burden on business’
(Regulation Taskforce 2006:2).
Regulators and policy makers have had to skill up to deal with the changing
nature of the policy and institutional environment. Regulatory agencies no longer
operate as traditional pubic sector bureaucracies in stable environments where
the organisation’s tasks are highly specified, discrete and carried out on a routine
basis (Considine 2005). The complexity of the tasks and the environment in
which regulators now work means staff need to exercise judgment and respond
with innovative solutions to problems as they emerge. Regulatory agencies need
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to be adaptive organisations responding to business demands and environmental
changes.
Steane and Carroll (2001), in reviewing the early work of the OECD on regulatory
reform, are critical of its argument that what is emerging and what is needed,
is a new regulatory state. In particular, they note that a key OECD report reveals
an expectation that the state ‘will be less intrusive, with other social systems,
notably markets providing the dynamic that will drive society. The state will
not ‘wither away’ but will become an ‘umpire’, adjudicating with regard to
transgressions of the rules.’ (Steane and Carroll 2001:33). They take issue with
this argument, suggesting that, in an environment of multiple networks of
contracts and public private partnerships, the task of governance becomes more
challenging as smaller public sector agencies work to influence and manage more
complex arrangements of inter-organisational relations (2001:39). It is, they
suggest, the need to manage this complexity that is now a major challenge for
government agencies and key stakeholders as they work to navigate, influence
and participate in the policy process.
The challenge of building innovation and flexibility into
regulatory regimes
A recent report on harmonisation in the Australian rail industry (BTRE 2006)
notes the difficulty of balancing the benefits of uniformity with customised
arrangements for localised operations. The report notes that in complex technical
systems like railways, with a relatively small number of operators, the potential
for regulators to adopt customised systems is far more likely. Combine this with
the Australian federal structure of decision-making and the potential for
achieving uniformity in some areas of regulation become almost impossible. In
fact the report states:
The regulatory track record in Australia in the last decade is one of
regulatory instability. Since the establishment of State regulatory bodies
in the 1990s, the regulators have sought to maintain consistency. Despite
the signing of intergovernmental agreements on ‘rail safety’ and on ‘rail
operational uniformity’ (in 1996 and 1999, respectively), jurisdictional
safety regulators continued to develop safety regulations on an individual
basis. Regulatory systems diverged from the outset (BTRE 2006: XXV).
Failure to achieve uniformity however, is not all bad news. Developments in
regulatory techniques and compliance technology now mean that jurisdictions
are developing the capacity to manage and regulate for variable standards of
performance within similar industries. The focus of regulatory enforcement is
moving away from prescriptive rules to outcomes and performance-based
standards. Innovation in approaches to regulation requires both the industry
and government agencies to have an informed understanding of regulation and
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greater capability to work within complex regulatory regimes. How do we get
such regulatory innovation to prosper in a climate of reform that remains focussed
on the rhetoric of deregulation, red tape reduction and a preference for simple
prescriptive consistency?
The National Transport Commission (NTC) as a model for
capacity building
It is in this context that the experience and practices of the NTC are worth
reviewing. This institutional model demonstrates the value of linking sector
wide capacity building with reform programs. While the primary function of
the NTC is to promote uniform regulation in land transport the Commission’s
influence and approach to its work also develops industry and government
capacity to work more effectively in an ever changing regulatory environment.
The Commission plays a key role in shaping industry opinion and attitudes
towards reform and regulation (Painter 1998:146).
The NTC experience demonstrates that as well as supporting uniformity there
are times where industry concerns centre on the lack of flexibility and capacity
of regulation to account for local variation and need. There is a desire for
regulatory regimes to accommodate two opposing views:
• consistent treatment of all participants under uniform systems and
requirements; and
• a capacity to accommodate variation based on local circumstances.
The NTC has developed a culture of cooperative decision-making in the
development of land transport policy and regulatory reform (Wilson and Moore
2006:298). It has an extensive range of consultation mechanisms and this includes
regulatory authorities, transport agencies, enforcement agencies and
representatives from the road and rail industry. The effectiveness of the NTC
model rests in its robust policy development process, one that engages transport
ministers and links their decisions on reform to a broad intergovernmental
agreement that commits governments to a reform process. It is also a participative
process, with substantial input from industry advisory bodies, ensuring a broad
range of stakeholders are engaged and have access to the process.
Since its inception in 1992 the Commission has progressed regulatory reform in
a range of areas impacting on land transport. This has included driver licensing
regulations, vehicle standards, emission standards, vehicle registration regulations
and legislation governing compliance and enforcement arrangements. The
Commission’s current approach to the development and implementation of the
new national rail safety laws involves communication strategies, provision of
information and guidelines and working groups aimed at helping parties in the
rail industry to comply with the legislative requirements. In preparing for the
implementation of new rail safety regulation the NTC has also looked at how
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reform will be maintained into the future. This action is more about building
and sustaining regulatory and compliance capacity in the sector. Their work
includes the release of an information package for stakeholders that explains
how states and territories will work together to ensure regulatory consistency
(NTC 2006:2).
The Commission has also recommended changes to the institutional arrangements
for the administration of rail safety regulatory regimes. This includes:
• establishing development and approval processes for national guidelines and
codes;
• detailing processes for the maintenance and review of legislation, regulations
and guideline material; and
• establishing administrative arrangements for the recognition of industry
codes and standards (NTC 2006).
It is this type of analysis that reform agendas should aim to promote but tend
to neglect. The work of the NTC in rail safety recognises the need to develop
mechanisms to more effectively manage complex systems for the benefit of
governments, industry and the community (NTC 2004). While not an explicit
role of the organisation, the Commission’s work in developing regulations has
a major influence on the understanding stakeholders have of the regulatory
framework within which they operate. The consultative work of the NTC brings
industry and government into the regulatory development process and jointly
builds their understanding of what is a dynamic regulatory environment. The
outcome is an improvement in both regulation-making and compliance in the
land transport sector.
Conclusion
The governing of policy in a federal system increasingly involves complex
systems of state and non-state actors and we need to rethink our approach to
regulatory reform to include the building of sector wide capacity to effectively
operate within such complex and dynamic environments. An advantage of our
federal system is that it enables local variation to meet local needs, responding
with a degree of sensitivity to pressures at a variety of levels of government. It
provides an admittedly complex set of state based and nationally based
consultative forums. In land transport reform the National Transport Commission
is a key player in this process, both enabling differing interests to have a voice,
as well as playing an essential part in guiding and managing, as an independent
body, what is a necessarily complex system.
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The aim of this chapter is to examine the origins and the objectives of the National
Reform Agenda. The Council of Australian Government’s (COAG) National
Reform Agenda is an important reform initiative that is close to the heart of
many public policy makers across Australia. The Victorian Government has been
advocating since 2005, particularly through COAG, that all governments need
to develop a new National Reform Agenda with regulatory reform and human
capital at its heart.
Throughout 2006, officials from all jurisdictions worked hard to make the
National Reform Agenda (NRA) a reality. As work advanced on this — whether
through ongoing discussions with the Commonwealth and other jurisdictions,
or through the development of specific reform proposals — state jurisdictions
remained convinced of the potential and necessity of a new reform agenda.
Arguing for change has not been easy but there is strong evidence that supports
the case for this reform proposal.
The chapter will cover the rationale for this agenda, outlining the evidence that
has compelled policy makers and public servants to persevere. ‘Evidence-based’
policy has been a key tool in contemplating and developing the argument for a
new reform approach. The chapter will then examine what the National Reform
Agenda, including regulation and human capital reform, should look like and,
finally, discuss the critical success factors for genuine national reform. It is
important to note that, as this is a reform agenda that continues to evolve, the
paper only covers the period to November 2006 and does not consider important
developments that have occurred since that time.
The impact and legacy of past reforms
Since 2005 the Council of Australian Governments has become a critical forum
where a strong debate around a new National Reform Agenda has occurred. The
Victorian Government, with support from the other states, has played a leadership
role in this debate, consistently arguing at COAG and in COAG related fora that
behind Australia’s current prosperity is a legacy of reform by previous
governments. The Victorian Government has also argued that more needs to be
done. The first wave of reform from the early 1980s saw the floating of the dollar,
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the deregulation of financial markets and the effective end of tariff barriers
designed to protect Australia’s industries.
The second wave of reform from the early to mid 1990s included agreement to
implement National Competition Policy (NCP) as its centrepiece. Australia has
enjoyed some 15 consecutive years of economic growth and these two major
waves of economic reform are behind what has been described as ‘the miracle
economy’ (The Economist 2003). Supporters of the NRA have argued that, while
we should recognise our achievements to date, the evidence suggests there is
no time for complacency and more reforms are required.
The evidence that supports new reforms
Evidence of the need for continuing reform is compelling. Australia has enjoyed
unprecedented prosperity in recent decades. We are experiencing the longest
period of continuous economic growth since Federation, which is manifest in
the steady increase in productivity and the steady decrease in unemployment.
However, despite our recent successes, in 2004 Australia still ranked in the
bottom 10 countries of the OECD in terms of labour productivity.
In addition, we also know that labour force participation rates of Australian men
and women are generally lower than in the United States and the OECD average.
There is significant room to improve our workforce participation rates for women
with dependent children and for the older age cohorts. Supporters of the NRA
have argued that we need to get better at assisting to women combine work and
family and enabling older age groups to phase into retirement. A strong argument
in the NRA arena has been that governments must look ahead and plan for the
future.
Surveys of the global economic landscape by organisations such as the OECD
reveal other major challenges facing Australia in the medium to long term. These
challenges are well recognised by all Australian governments, commentators
and the OECD (OECD 2006). In putting forward the case for the NRA, the
Victorian Government has argued that the new set of challenges facing Australia
over the coming decades are particularly linked to the ageing population and a
more competitive international environment.
We know that our ageing population will present governments with considerable
economic and fiscal pressures, particularly on the health system. In the next 40
years, around 45% of our population will not be participating in the workforce.
This will place an enormous burden on those still in the workforce. At the same
time, business will continue to depend on recruiting an efficient, skilled and
healthy workforce.
We are also aware of the increasing impact of international competitive pressures
and related opportunities. In coming decades China will overtake the United
States as the world’s largest economy and, with India, will make up the top
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three. This will place pressure on both low wage and high wage jobs and
industries. These economic changes will make skills increasingly important.
NRA policy makers have argued that preparing our workforce for the future
will be a challenge for all governments and that the challenges ahead in the
coming decades demand a reform agenda that is more ambitious than that of the
1980s and 1990s.
Data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) in 2005 shows
that Australia’s ranking against other OECD countries, based on GDP per capita
(USD in 2002), declined from the 1950s to the early 1980s but started to pick up
in the early to mid 1990s, arguably coinciding with the first and second waves
of reform. It has been argued that, in order for Australia to continue climbing
the global income ladder, we need a new, ambitious agenda of national economic
reform.
With considerable room for improvement in our current performance and the
well recognised challenges of an ageing population and a more competitive
international environment described above, there is a compelling argument for
a new wave of reform. The argument has called for a third wave of reform which
builds on and leverages our current successes so that we are well positioned to
continue ‘punching above our weight’ on the global stage.
The third wave of reform explained
In response to what Australian state governments considered as inadequate
reform at the national level, coinciding with an understanding of the clear need
to address the future challenges, the Victorian Government has argued for (and
indeed COAG has accepted) three key components under the new NRA. These
components are competition, regulation and human capital. In essence,
competition is about more competitive markets, regulation is about reducing
red tape and human capital is about a healthier, better skilled and a more
motivated workforce.
From 2005, the Victorian Government actively argued at COAG that a clear vision
for the next decade was needed, with all governments needing to work together
to boost Australia’s economic productivity and workforce participation. The
evidence suggests and COAG has agreed, that this can be done by boosting
productivity and lifting participation through a continued focus on business
(through the lenses of competition and regulation mentioned above) and a new
focus on human capital.
The NRA is a complex, interrelated and long term agenda with a simple message
at its heart. It argues that governments need to work together for the common
good to drive improvements to our productivity and lift workforce participation.
The Victorian Government has also argued that the NRA requires a decade-long
focus on reform in order to gain more immediate opportunities, such as
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completing the NCP reforms and extending the NCP reform agenda to include
regulatory and infrastructure reform.
Completing competition reforms and further reducing the
regulatory burden
The Victorian Government has argued that significant gains can be made through
completing the competition reforms started in the 1990s and reducing regulatory
burden. It also argued that the proposed new ‘human capital’ agenda offers the
biggest economic potential and that additional reform opportunities should look
at new reform initiatives linked to increasing the productive capacity of our
people through health, education and training and work incentives. It has
recognised the need to complete competition reform and also reduce the burden
of regulation on our business. One line of argument pursued at COAG by
supporters of the NRA has been that completing NCP and pursuing further
regulation reform would allow Australia to drive further improvements to our
already highly competitive and well functioning markets. While most NCP
reforms have been substantially completed, there remains scope for further
gains, including through further progress towards a fully integrated national
electricity market, completing commitments to legislation review under NCP,
improving infrastructure regulation and competitive neutral road and rail pricing.
Another significant opportunity for governments is to reduce the burden of red
tape on our businesses. The ‘regulatory burden’ can be improved through
addressing both the process (via gate-keeping arrangements) and outcomes (via
targets that can be objectively verified). The Victorian Government has led by
example in this area. In July 2006 it announced, in addition to COAG initiatives,
that there would be no new regulatory burden with its introduction of an
‘offsetting simplification’ for new regulations — effectively the identification
of a ‘one in, one out’ principle with regard to regulation. The Victorian
Government also committed at that time to reducing the current burden by
committing to a target of a 15% reduction in the cost of administrative burdens
in three years and 25% in five years.
In 2006, progress was made at the national level on reducing the regulatory
burden. The COAG Communiqué of February 2006 notes that COAG has agreed
‘to a range of measures to ensure best-practice regulation-making and review
and to make ‘down payment’ on regulatory reduction by taking action now to
reduce specific regulation ‘hotspots’ (COAG 2006).
Following the February 2006 decision, jurisdictions have been working together
on a range of issues. This includes best practice regulation-making within
jurisdictions through improved gate keeping processes and across jurisdictions
through developing principles for determining when uniform, harmonised or
jurisdiction-specific regulation is 'best’.
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COAG also agreed to take action with regard to 10 'hotspots' at its February and
July 2006 meetings, that is, priority areas where regulatory overlap is seen as
impeding economic activity. The hotspots include: Occupational Health and
Safety (OHS); Building Regulation; Rail Safety Regulation; Environmental
Assessments & Approvals; and Business Registration Processes. The rationale
was that if governments could make real progress in these areas, they could
demonstrate the potential for further reform. Many of these areas, such as OHS,
are affirmed as a priority focus by the publicly expressed views of business
interests, notably the Business Council of Australia. Jurisdictions have also been
working together on a framework for the annual review of existing regulation
in each jurisdiction for the purposes of reducing the burden on business. The
Victorian Government has demonstrated a commitment to this agenda with the
establishment of a standalone gatekeeper in relation to regulation — the Victorian
Competition and Efficiency Commission (VCEC) — and with its ‘Reducing the
Regulatory Burden’ initiative that includes the ambitious targets for reducing
the regulatory compliance burden of 15 % over 3 years and 25 % over the next
five years (Department of Treasury and Finance (Victoria) 2006).
The human capital agenda
The human capital agenda mentioned above is a particularly innovative and
compelling component in the ‘story’ about the need for reform. The Human
Capital agenda argues that Australia needs a healthier, skilled, more motivated
workforce so that our businesses can continue to compete and succeed in the
global economy. We know that, in addition to the well-founded social reasons,
there are strong economic reasons why governments should invest in improving
people’s health outcomes, improving the skills of our population and creating
a motivated workforce.
The argument about the importance of Australia’s human capital is at the heart
of the NRA. The NRA approach at COAG is a marked change from a time in the
past when governments came together at COAG to discuss social policy reforms
which tended to focus in isolation on the ‘latest crisis’. For example, the previous
premiers’ conferences focused on isolated policy content such as the number of
hospital beds, ‘drugs’ in schools at COAG in 1999 and child protection at COAG
in 2002. The NRA has tried to move away from ‘crisis management’ by
encouraging a view across portfolios — looking for synergies in education
outcomes and health outcomes. Promoting healthy living in schools is an obvious
example. The NRA puts forward a long-term perspective, looking at government
interventions across a lifecycle, for example from developing good diet and
exercise habits in childhood to maintaining good habits as we get older and
managing good health in the longer term.
This long-term perspective is particularly important. The NRA allows
governments to make specific decisions about investing in early intervention
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based on the evidence that this investment is critical if we are to make a difference
to long-term outcomes. The NRA provides governments with a framework that
promotes a long term view.
How big could the gains be?
Modelling by the Victorian Department of Treasury has estimated that the
benefits from reform are significant and will continue to grow for 20 years
(Department of Treasury and Finance (Vic) 2005). They show that NRA’s potential
economic significance could add some 3% to 5% to annual GDP after 10 years,
with more than a 10% increase after 25 years. This would amount to an additional
$65 billion to the Australian economy. The preliminary estimates from the Federal
Government’s Productivity Commission confirm Victoria’s conclusion that the
potential economic benefits from human capital reform are particularly significant
and warrant a concerted effort from policy makers and political leaders
(Productivity Commission 2006). One example of an area where reforms could
lead to significant gains is by lowering rates of diabetes, an area which is part
of the first tranche of specific human capital reforms that COAG agreed to
consider in 2007. Further, the Victorian Department of Treasury’s modelling of
specific diabetes initiatives demonstrates that the vast bulk of these financial
benefits will flow to the Commonwealth (as increased income tax and reduced
calls on health spending and welfare payments). These outcomes raise the
question of funding for these actions and the equitable sharing of the benefits
of reform.
COAG’s commitment to the NRA
In 2006, building on discussions that took place in 2005, COAG reached
significant agreements on the NRA. In February it agreed to, among other issues:
endorse the NRA; an overall framework of multilateral and jurisdictional-specific
policy proposals; the creation of a COAG Reform Council (CRC); and to a fair
sharing of costs and benefits (COAG 2006a). In July 2006, among other agreements
there was: a re-affirmation of a 10 year NRA framework and a fair sharing of
costs and benefits; agreement to 11, indicative high-level human capital outcomes;
that the COAG Reform Council would assess costs and benefits; agreement to an
initial focus on three human capital areas, as a first step, by the next COAG
meeting; and agreement that the next COAG, to be held in early 2007, would
consider specific reform proposals being developed by the Human Capital
Working Group and Competition and Regulation Working Group (and their
subgroups) with representatives from all jurisdictions (COAG 2006b).
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Factors to ensure the success of the third wave
A number of factors underpin the success of the NRA, which brings together a
number of related objectives. These objectives primarily include economic
prosperity, social cohesion and healthy federalism.
First, the NRA has economic prosperity as a key objective, through improving
productivity and participation and by being able to meet the new economic
challenges of an ageing population, international competitive challenges and an
increasing premium on skills in the economy.
Another objective is social cohesion, thereby enabling the best outcomes for the
individual and by improving social cohesion more generally. The NRA has
argued for the benefits and necessity, of promoting social inclusion and mobility,
through a lens of economic reform. The joint goals of participation and
productivity link closely to the proposed human capital agenda in terms of the
need to improve literacy and numeracy at school; more successful youth
transitions; raising adult skills; and improving workforce participation by
preventing illness and disease.
Finally, NRA has building a healthy federalism as an objective. Public policy
makers in Victoria have argued that, through establishing a framework that
creates the right incentives for all governments to work together towards common
outcomes, the NRA can improve the health of the Australian federal system. The
NRA has challenged governments to change the way they work together, to
focus on agreed outcomes rather than contestable ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ and to
focus on a truly fair sharing of the costs and benefits.
COAG has agreed on the solid conceptual framework for the National Reform
Agenda. That is, having agreed the vision, objectives and reform priorities,
governments agreed to focus on outcomes and measuring progress against those
outcomes. This is a significant shift from the ‘old’ ways of COAG, where there
was an undue emphasis on specific inputs and actions. The ‘old’ way of doing
things had fostered an unproductive game of ‘points scoring’ and ‘blame shifting’
and resulted in a financial framework between governments (for example, specific
purpose payments), that could be too focused on administration and red tape
and too little on outcomes. By agreeing on what governments want to achieve
and how they will measure progress towards that achievement, the debate moved
away from ‘who does what and for how much’ towards ‘what we need to do
and for what benefit’.
A new way of states working with the Commonwealth
The NRA proposed a new way of working with the Commonwealth that included
four key elements: collaboration; an outcomes-based approach; jurisdictional
flexibility; and a long-term and integrated reform agenda across portfolio areas.
The Victorian Government has argued that collaboration is about agreeing to
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implement policies in more integrated ways, including collaboration on interface
issues. An outcomes-based approach is about focusing policies on achieving
outcomes for the community, not prescribing actions. Jurisdictional flexibility
relies on moving away from a one-size-fits-all approach to reform that allows
jurisdictions to pursue outcomes in ways that reflect different systems,
circumstances and priorities. Finally, the Victorian Government has argued that
the NRA is about a long-term and integrated reform agenda across portfolio areas
where COAG would focus on the outcomes that matter to the economy and
community and collectively undertake long-term integrated reform across
portfolio areas.
We are not starting on a green field site. Australia has successfully implemented
collaborative national reform previously. The NCP is widely acknowledged as
one of the most successful collaborative reform efforts since Federation. The
Productivity Commission’s review of National Competition Policy reforms
identified four key success factors that made NCP so successful (Productivity
Commission 2005). These were: recognition by all governments of the need for
reform; broad agreement on the priority problem areas; a solid conceptual
framework and information base to guide policy prescriptions; and some highly
effective procedural and institutional mechanisms to implement reform.
The NCP procedural and institutional mechanisms were important and included
transparent and independent monitoring of progress and outcomes, robust
accountability arrangements and financial incentives to states and territories.
Gary Banks, the chair of the Productivity Commission has proposed that the
framework to drive successful reform into the twenty-first century should
contain ‘independent monitoring and assessment of progress in implementing
agreed reforms’, ‘robust accountability arrangements (including) progress
measures’; and ‘financial incentives to the states and territories to enable an
appropriate sharing of the costs and benefits of reform’ (Banks 2006).
These are all elements which the Victorian Government has advocated as critical
to the success of the NRA. The evidence suggests that without the appropriate
incentives and a robust framework, governments will not be able to deliver the
ambitious reform agenda required to meet the challenges ahead.
The importance of the right institutional arrangements
Ensuring that the right institutional arrangements exist to provide the right
incentives to deliver against agreed outcomes is the critical success factor for
the NRA. Having an effective independent body to monitor the reform agenda
is part of this. COAG in July 2006 went some way towards achieving this, in
agreeing to establish the COAG Reform Council (CRC). The Productivity
Commission has also recognised the importance of incentives. Gary Banks,
Chairman of the Productivity Commission in a 2006 speech to the ‘Making the
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Boom Pay’ conference in Melbourne succinctly described this issue in the context
of regulation:
While many regulatory reforms will be clearly beneficial to the
jurisdictions implementing them, reforms directed at achieving national
consistency may not yield benefits to individual jurisdictions
commensurate with national gains. In such circumstances, there may be
a case for the Australian Government to provide financial incentives for
jurisdictions to take a broader view.2
The case is even more stark in the area of human capital reform, where the States
and Territories will do the bulk of the ‘heavy lifting’. Modelling suggests that
the Commonwealth will receive the majority of the benefits. While COAG has
agreed in principle to the fair sharing of the costs and benefits of reform, it
remains to be seen how this agreement will be implemented.
Early support
This case for the need for a third wave of reform has been supported by key
stakeholders like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Business Council
of Australia, who have argued strongly for a new wave of national reform. At
the meeting of the IMF Executive Board in October 2006, directors ‘welcomed
the agreement between the Australian and state governments on the ambitious
NRA to lift productivity and labour participation over the next decade’
(International Monetary Fund 2006). The Productivity Commission Annual Report
in October 2006 noted that:
The NRA is wide-ranging and ambitious. It lays down some challenging
objectives for reform within its ‘human capital’ stream, along with more
specific initiatives in the competition and regulatory reform streams to
complete and build on the NCP.3
As these quotes indicate, support for the NRA is strong among and widespread.
There is explicit recognition that Australia must undertake ambitious reforms
and that incentives serve as the best way to drive this process. There is also a
sense that reform commitments, particularly in relation to competition and
regulation reform, need to be put into action quickly.
Conclusion
We are at an interesting point in the history of our Federation. There are
pressures on our federal system through the changing expectations of the
Australian population, the evolving legal landscape and the increasing pressure
on governments to deliver ‘more for less’. If implemented completely, the
National Reform Agenda offers governments a way to respond to these pressures
and creates a framework for a decade of collaborative national reform. It also
can provide us with the opportunity to equip Australians with better skills,
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better health and better systems to respond to the economic demands of the
future.
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Chapter 6. Rethinking Regulation
Peter Carroll
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to assess the Report of the Commonwealth Government’s
Taskforce on Reducing the Regulatory Burden on Business (the Banks Report),
released in April 2006 and the government’s endorsement of those
recommendations (Australian Government 2006a; 2006b). The endorsement,
followed by the beginning of the implementation of the recommendations,
constitutes, together with the items encompassed in the National Reform Agenda,
a centrepiece of the third wave of regulatory reform in Australia. The focus of
the chapter is the report’s recommendations with regard to the system for making
regulation with regard to business, particularly the regulation impact statement
process (RIS), as discussed in chapter two. In summary, the overall assessment
is that there is much in the report to be commended but that it is, for the most
part, one that calls for greater commitment and support for existing systems for
making and implementing business regulation, rather than a fundamental
rethinking of the existing system.
The Banks Report: origins
The origins of the Commonwealth Government’s 2005 decision to establish the
Taskforce on Reducing the Regulatory Burden on Business can be found in the
long-standing commitment of successive Australian Governments to a minimum
of effective business regulation as a primary means of ensuring the international
competitiveness of the Australian economy, combined with pressure from peak
business associations such as the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(ACCI), the Business Council of Australia (BCA) and from the Productivity
Commission, part of whose role is to provide advice in relation to the regulation
of business (see, for example, Howard 1997; ACCI 2005a;2005b; BCA 2005a;
2005b; Productivity Commission 2003; 2004; 2005; Banks 2003a; 2003b; 2004).
The Taskforce was designed primarily to identify the views of business, for the
benefit of business and with its members being drawn from business (Australian
Government 2006a: A1). The Taskforce’s Report was submitted on 31 January
2006 and released, together with the government’s Interim Response to its
recommendations, on 7 April (Banks 2006; Australian Government 2006).
The core arguments of the Banks Report
The Report’s core arguments for reform are contained in the first three chapters.
In summary, chapter one sets the scene by noting that all societies need an
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appropriate level of regulation, that there have been substantial gains from
regulatory reform over the past 20 years but, also, that there has been a rapid
increase in both the volume of regulation, some justified, some not, with rising
concern from business as to the increasing cost of compliance, leading to the
need for a new wave of reform. Chapter two of the report expands on the basic
arguments put forward in chapter one, stressing, in addition, that, while much
of the new regulation might be appropriate, some was not and, importantly,
that it was the cumulative burden of regulation on individual businesses that
was of especial concern, leading to increasing compliance costs and the
displacement of time and resources that otherwise could be spent on more creative
and innovative behaviour (Banks 2006: 5). It then puts forward the core of its
argument in favour of reform, indicating that the fundamental cause of increasing
regulation is ‘increasing risk aversion in many spheres of life’ (Banks 2006: 14).
In turn, the report argues, while an effective regulation-making and
administrative system should ‘mediate’, the impact of the increasing demands
that arise from an increasingly risk averse society, this was not happening for
four basic reasons (Banks 2006: 15):
• the real costs of regulation are ‘hidden’, from view as they are the
‘off-budget’, costs of business and society compliance with regulation;
• the cumulative cost of regulation is not often considered as most departments
and agencies have responsibility only for specific regulation and little concern
for its cumulative nature;
• the culture of some regulators fosters excessive and poor regulation as they
respond to incentives to ‘protect’ consumers with heavy handed, prescriptive,
legalistic enforcement, a ‘government knows best’ attitude and a general
distrust of business people; and
• the regulation impact statement (RIS) system — introduced to minimise the
externalities noted above — helped, but, the report notes, was often
circumvented or treated as an afterthought.
The report underlines a pressing need for regulatory reform encompassing the
reform of specific regulations, regulation-making and implementation processes.
In addition, the report places special emphasis on reducing the compliance
burden (Banks 2006: 15-16). The reform imperative, says the report, is heightened
by the challenges posed by the following:
• an ageing society;
• increased competition from low-cost and lightly-regulated industries in China
and India;
• the inherent limitations of small scale operations in a small economy;
• substantial distances between domestic and international markets; and
• the increasing rate of regulatory reform taking place in other countries such
as the UK and the USA (Banks 2006: 16).
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While the government’s responses to the report do not formally and explicitly
indicate its agreement with its analysis of the underlying causes of regulation,
the fact that it commended the Taskforce on its work and, at least in relation to
those recommendations related to the making and implementation of regulation,
accepted all bar two of its 29 recommendations, suggests that it was sympathetic
to that analysis.
The risk-averse society proposition is contentious, similar to that expressed by
UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, with regard to British society (Banks 2005: 4;
2006a: 14). Whatever strength it has is markedly lessened by the following three
flaws. The first is the report’s failure to explain adequately how an increasingly
risk-averse society could have tolerated the major microeconomic reforms in the
later 1980s, 1990s and the earlier part of the 2000s — the same period in which
social risk-averseness was allegedly growing (Banks 2006: i). This is not to deny
that there may well have been a rise in the extent and type of regulation in
recent decades, however, this is as likely to have arisen because of established,
if variable, patterns of interest group pressure (including from business), as from
a change in the risk tolerance of Australian society. The second flaw is the
report’s failure to produce any systematic, empirical evidence as to past and
present trends in the ‘risk averseness’ of Australian society to support its
argument. The third flaw is the somewhat circular nature of the risk averseness
argument, with the cause of the increasing volume and poor quality of some
regulation being identified as risk averseness and the only ‘evidence’ of risk
averseness being the growth in volume of regulation measured, very crudely,
by reference to the number of pages of legislation per annum.
The report does provide some fascinating statistics to illustrate and support its
claim for the growth in volume of regulation, noting that the Australian
Parliament had passed more pages of legislation since 1990 than it had in the
first 90 years of federation (Banks 2006: 6). It notes that the growth in the number
of pages does not necessarily indicate a similar, dramatic growth in regulations,
however, the statistics clearly are meant to impress the reader and imply that
there has been a similar, if not quite as dramatic growth in regulation. However,
it could be convincingly argued that the spectacular growth in volume of
regulation at the height of the microeconomic reform program in the 1990s was,
in addition to the promulgation of new regulation, at least partly a result of
attempts to render existing regulation into ‘plain English’ in order to make its
intent clearer and more specific. The use of ‘plain English’, while important,
does not bring with it any necessary reduction in the number of words needed
to expound complex regulation.
The report also stresses that the compliance cost to business ‘may well total
billions of dollars’ (Banks 2006:13). It provides estimates from various studies
that indicate the total, annual cost is anywhere from $11 billion to $86 billion,
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indicating its preference for the more conservative estimates (Banks 2006: 14).
However, the value of presenting such wildly differing estimates, other than to
convince the less-informed reader of the cost of regulation, is highly questionable,
especially given the view expressed in the report that none of the studies quoted
estimate the net cost of regulation and that they should not be viewed as ‘robust
estimates’ (Banks 2006: 13-14). This begs the question as to why they were
included for they can hardly contribute to informed debate, given their wildly
varying estimates.
The argument that the real costs of regulation are the hidden, off-budget costs
of business and society compliance is similarly difficult to accept as a fundamental
cause of over-regulation. If the costs were so well hidden, would it not have
been far more difficult for business interests and the Productivity Commission
(and its predecessors) to persuade successive governments of both political
persuasions to undertake major waves of regulatory reform? Moreover, both
directly and indirectly, the annual reports of the Commission have drawn
attention to such costs. This is not to reject the fact that the full costs are not
known with any degree of precision and that, if they were, governments might
be more reluctant to impose regulation without fuller evaluation of those costs.
The argument that the cumulative cost of regulation is rarely considered as most
departments and agencies have responsibility only for specific regulation and
little concern for its cumulative nature, is a good, if not fully convincing point.
However, in the shape of the Productivity Commission, it is an argument that
has had a powerful, articulate and well-publicised proponent for many years,
backed by business voices and, again, in the shape of successive waves of
regulatory reform since the mid-1980s, has had some impact. Perhaps, an at least
as important a cause has been the failure of the Commission and business to
provide accurate and convincing data as to the net impact of business regulation
to support the argument. This author, for example, has not been able to identify
any convincing estimates of the typical, net cost to a small business and to society
of the full range of regulation to which they are subject.
The argument that the culture of some regulators fosters excessive and poor
regulation, however accurate as a portrayal of business views of regulators, lacks
any firm basis in systematic research. Only if and when convincing, reliable
data is provided should it be given any credence. This is not to deny that some
individual regulators may have such attitudes and approaches, similar to attitudes
and approaches displayed by some businesses toward some clients.
The final argument, in relation to the weaknesses of the RIS process and the
associated systems for making and implementing regulation, is elaborated at




Recommendation 7.1: six principles of good regulatory
process and the RIS system
In recommending the adoption of six principles for the making and
implementation of regulation, the Taskforce is doing little more than asking the
government to re-endorse a system for the making of regulation in relation to
business that it had endorsed since entering office — the RIS system. Why the
Taskforce should be asking, in effect, for a re-endorsement of the basic principles
underpinning the RIS system is explained by its ambiguous view of RIS. It
identifies its weaknesses as a major factor contributing to the growth of regulation
and its cost but also notes that it is ‘…sound in principle’ but, unfortunately,
that it had not been consistently applied, a barely veiled criticism of both the
executive and administrative arms of government (Banks 2006: 15). There is no
suggestion that RIS may not be ‘sound in principle’. The business submissions
to the report expressed strong support for the RIS system but also noted that it
needed strengthening, a view that the Taskforce endorsed in recommendations
7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 7.12, 7.13, that, in summary proposed: one, the
standard of analysis considered acceptable for a regulation impact statement
should be increased for the regulation in question to be approved; two, that it
should be made harder for a regulatory proposal to proceed to a decision if the
government’s requirements for good process had not been adequately discharged;
and three, that several basic elements of the system needed substantial
strengthening (Banks 2006: vi).
While this author has a great deal of sympathy with the need for a rational,
systematic approach to policy-making, whether it be with regard to business or
any other area, the claim that RIS is sound in principle might be questioned, at
least as regards its degree of ‘fit’ with the dynamics of politics in a democracy
such as Australia’s. In particular, it has to be remembered that any system for
policy-making in a democracy will inevitably be subject to competing political
forces — from those wishing change for the benefits they hope it will bring to
those who resist change for fear the benefits that they currently receive will
diminish or be eliminated. Policy-making — whether or not it is referred to as
regulation-making — is an intensely political process, an arena in which
regulation-making is determined as much by the relative power of the
participants as by process and the quality of regulatory content. Efforts to
promote a greater degree of rationality, such as the recommendations of the
Taskforce in relation to RIS, are to be welcomed for the improvements in content
and process performance they might bring but they are not immune from the
exercise of power in the policy process. This is the central problem faced by
those concerned at the growth of regulation and by RIS and its adherents. It is
the reason that popularly elected ministers will always vary in their degree of
support for such a system, for they are players in the policy process, acutely
sensitive to its demands and constraints. If they are not they do not remain as
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ministers for any length of time. RIS may be sound in principle, if the principles
involved are those derived from the assumptions that humans are perfectly
rational in their motives and actions. Unfortunately, they are less sound when
faced with the realities of a political system in which rationality is limited and
motives often short-sighted and selfish.
Consulting with business: recommendations 7.5, 7.6, 7.7,
7.19, 7.20, 7.21, 7.22
The report expressed serious concern regarding inadequacies in consulting with
business, noting, in particular, a survey undertaken by the Australian Public
Service Commission that found that only 25% of regulatory agencies had engaged
with the public when developing regulations (Australian Public Service
Commission 2005: 56, as noted in Banks 2006: 152). Not unreasonably, it was
felt that less than adequate consultation tended to result in poorer quality
regulation and the report recommended that the government develop: in
recommendation 7.5, a whole of government policy on consultation, with detailed
principles to be followed by all departments and agencies; in recommendation
7.6, for major, proposed regulation, the preparation and release of an initial
‘green chapter’, to all relevant parties, followed by successive ‘exposure’, drafts
to test out options with business interests; and in recommendation 7.7, a business
consultation website that would automatically notify, on a voluntary basis,
registered businesses and government agencies of new developments (Banks
2006: 154). All of these recommendations were accepted.
The authors of the report seem not to have appreciated the irony of calling for
greater and more effective consultation with business at the same time as it was
suggesting that existing consultation practices had partly resulted in too much
inappropriate regulation in a risk-averse society. It seems to have been felt that
business groups were perhaps not so risk-averse: that their more effective
participation would lead to greater business influence and, hence, better quality
and less regulation. While a cynic might feel otherwise, the call for more
systematic consultation is appropriate, given the somewhat surprising lack of
consultation, provided that safeguards are built in to the system to ensure that
those being consulted do not ‘capture’, the regulators to the extent that their
views become those embodied, untested, in regulation. In part to provide such
a safeguard, the report recommended the establishment of standing consultative
bodies consisting of stakeholder representatives for each regulation with a major
impact on business and the development of a consultation code of conduct
modelled on the UK’s new system (Australian Government 2006a: 165).
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Increasing analytical capacity: recommendations 7.2, 7.3,
7.4, 7.13
The lack of analytical capacity and expertise, especially with regard to
cost/benefit analysis and risk assessment, was identified as a major failing and
recommendations 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.13 were aimed at its improvement. The
Report argued that improvements in this area were one of three key areas where
reform was most needed as part of a concerted effort to identify and contain the
compliance costs to business of increasing regulation, especially for small
business. Its concerns were those that had been voiced in several reports from
the Productivity Commission (see Productivity Commission 2005: 26).
Hence, the recommendations to increase analytical capacity are to be welcomed
and all were accepted, although a few points can be made in relation to them.
Recommendation 7.2, to use cost benefit analysis (CBA), to compare different
regulatory options could, perhaps, have gone a little further. What type and
range of regulatory options, for example, should be subject to CBA? What
constitutes ‘adequate risk analysis’, as recommended by the report and who is
to judge what is adequate? If ORR (now the Office of Best Practice Regulation),
is to have this function, then, even accepting the government’s commitment to
the bulk of the Taskforce’s recommendations it is difficult to see how it will be
able to prevent a determined minister and department proceeding with
regulations deemed inadequate by the ORR.
Recommendation 7.13, that departments and agencies should ensure that their
capacity to undertake good regulatory analysis is adequately resourced is yet
another ‘motherhood’, assertion for, in principle, no government could object
to it, nor did the Australian Government. However, no specific resource allocation
is suggested and, apart from the relatively minor amounts for an improved
website, it is unlikely to result in substantially greater allocations to
policy-making units within other departments and agencies unless their ministers
and, ultimately, cabinet, agree to increased allocations in the annual budgetary
processes. At best, in accepting the recommendation a signal has been sent to
departments that appropriate resourcing for regulatory analysis is a government
priority, so that if they feel current resources are not adequate and make a
reasonable case, they will get a sympathetic hearing in budget negotiations.
Those who gain the support of the ORR for their claims for greater funding
might be somewhat more successful, assuming that the ORR achieves the greater
power suggested above.
Saying ‘no’, to inadequate regulatory proposals:
recommendations 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 7.12
The development of appropriate analytical capacity will not, in itself, prevent
inadequate regulatory proposals being considered and accepted by
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decision-makers — including cabinet. These four recommendations are designed
to minimise the chances of this occurring. Recommendation 7.8 specifies the
grounds on which an RIS can be judged inadequate; 7.9 recommends that
‘institutional barriers’ be put in place to prevent an inadequate proposal
proceeding to a decision-maker; 7.10 recommends that cabinet agree to a revised
‘Guide to Regulation’ containing strengthened requirements on departments
and agencies making regulation; 7.12 recommends that ministerial responsibility
for overseeing the government’s regulatory processes and reform program be
elevated to cabinet level, thereby adding political ‘muscle’, to support rigour in
the RIS process.
The emphasis on the use of relevant international standards in relation to the
four recommendations is particularly interesting, with its stated presumption
that their use in the domestic context is appropriate unless an adequate
justification for a variation is provided in the RIS process. While the intent is
clear — to reduce the costs to business of having to meet differing domestic and
international standards — there are a number of potentially problematic issues
such as:
• the presumption that existing, international standards are appropriate for
the Australian context, unless proven otherwise, although regulators will
have the opportunity of identifying their weaknesses;
• the increased attention that domestic regulators and business interests will
have to give to the international institutions responsible for developing
international standards if they are to participate effectively in the
international decision-making processes involved;
• in a very real sense the locus of several, current, domestically focused decision
processes will move to the international arena, requiring regulators to develop
a thorough knowledge and expertise in operating in such arenas; and
• in turn, the accountability of the international institutions will have to be
examined and assessed for adequacy otherwise a distinct threat to domestic
democratic participatory processes might arise.
The unqualified acceptance of recommendation 7.9 is surprising because, on
first reading, it suggests that the cabinet, ministers and relevant statutory
authorities with regulation-making power will in future amend or even withdraw
their proposed regulations following the decisions of public servants in the ORR
regarding their compliance — or lack of it — with RIS requirements and the
adequacy of their RIS. A second reading of the government’s response corrects
this impression, for the institutional arrangements are not made explicit and
they will not necessarily involve the ORR — although it is difficult to see how
the ORR will not be involved, given the expansion of its management and
evaluation roles with regard to the RIS system. Moreover, in ‘exceptional
circumstances’, regulatory proposals can still proceed to cabinet or other
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decision-makers for final, pre-parliamentary decision and the recommendation
is restricted to regulatory proposals with undefined ‘material business impacts’.
Nevertheless, any new institutional arrangements that emerge will be of
considerable interest for all those interested in government, for they may result
in some form of self-denying ordinance that will restrict the capacity of ministers
to submit regulatory proposals to cabinet and the associated capacity of regulators
to submit, at an earlier stage in the process, regulatory proposals to their
superiors.
Recommendation 7.12, that ministerial responsibility for overseeing the
government’s regulatory processes and reform program should be elevated to
cabinet level was perhaps not well put, for ministerial responsibility for
overseeing regulatory processes and reform programs ultimately does rest with
cabinet. Therefore, the recommendation, as phrased, is redundant. What the
Taskforce seems to have been recommending was that greater political support
and commitment should be provided for the RIS process in general and, in
particular, the ORR’s judgements as to the adequacy of regulatory proposals
that it scrutinises. At present, the minister responsible for the RIS process is a
not a cabinet minister, although situated in the Treasury portfolio. While this
provides somewhat more political muscle for the process than when RIS was
first introduced, a minister with cabinet rank might be a more powerful advocate
for RIS in speaking out against inadequate submissions in the cabinet room.
While the Taskforce’s recommendation for the responsible minister to be of
cabinet rank is understandable, all ministers are in a difficult situation with
regard to processes such as RIS. In essence, they face a conflict of interest
situation, on the one hand committed under the doctrine of collective cabinet
responsibility to support cabinet’s formal support for RIS but, on the other hand,
as ministers responsible for departments, they face the prospect of a failed
regulatory proposal if the RIS evaluation for proposals arising from their
departments is negative. Moreover, the staff of ministerial offices and the heads
of department and senior public servants are well aware of this situation.
Whatever their personal feelings on the matter, it would be a very brave person
who resisted the wishes of a minister by advising that a favoured regulation was
not to be recommended and pursued following an adverse RIS assessment from
the ORR.
In this context, if a cabinet minister was to have responsibility, for example, for
arguing that a regulatory proposal should not be accepted for submission to
cabinet on the grounds of an adverse RIS evaluation, that minister would be in
a very difficult position. The minister whose department’s submission was in
question would undoubtedly resist, resulting in a conflict situation that would
substantially increase tension in cabinet. Moreover, cabinet deliberations are
not concerned only with the economic merits of regulatory proposals but with
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their political feasibility, a factor not incorporated in the RIS process or
evaluations.
Measuring regulatory performance: recommendations 7.16,
7.17, 7.18, 7.27, 7.28, 7.29
In accepting recommendation 7.16, for the development of a wider range of
performance indicators for annual reporting, a much needed step — and a brave
one — has been taken for, assuming that a useful set of performance indicators
are developed and put in place, they will enable more accurate judgements of
performance by the Opposition, the media and the electorate. There is little
doubt that the existing set of regulatory performance indicators, managed by
the Office of Small Business, have had little or no impact. No department or
agency seems to be using them, at least explicitly and in published sources, as
a means of identifying the causes of poor performance, or for improving on
existing performance, a situation of which the Office of Small Business and the
ORR are well aware.
However, the task of developing a useful and effective set of indicators is going
to be difficult. In essence, for example, most regulations are akin to theories,
requiring that their targets either engage or not engage in defined sets of
behaviours. At best, as with all theory in the social sciences, regulatory theory
will be only partially successful in achieving its goals, depending upon the
adequacy of theory itself, the efficiency with which it is implemented, the degree
of compliance of the target group and the context within which it is implemented
remaining relatively unchanging. To design a useful set of indicators in these
circumstances will be a challenge, for it is likely that they will have to cover not
only regulatory outcomes (in other words, ‘did the regulation achieve its
purpose?’) — perhaps the indicator of most use for the executive — but also
indicators for outputs and implementation.
In the interests of justice and equity, the acceptance of recommendation 7.17,
for the establishment of mechanisms for internally reviewing decisions where
they do not exist, seems to have been accompanied by a degree of reluctance,
for it is an acceptance only in principle to request — not require — regulators
to ‘consider’, internal review mechanisms, where appropriate. It is difficult to
understand this apparent reluctance, other than on grounds of possible costs
for, as the Taskforce asserts, effective appeal mechanisms help ensure fairness
for those adversely impacted by a decision as well as providing potentially useful
feedback to regulators as to inadequate regulation and inadequate
implementation. In many cases, for example, existing appeal mechanisms could
be used, such as the Administrative Review Tribunal, by simply extending their
coverage. A similar degree of reluctance may be apparent in 7.18, where there
is only agreement in principle to the recommendation that there should be
provision for merit review of any administrative decision that can significantly
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affect the interests of individuals or enterprises. The Government notes that it
will ‘continue to scrutinise legislative proposals on a case-by-case basis’, neatly
side-stepping the fact that legislative proposals are not ‘administrative decisions’.
Hence, if this response is not simply careless drafting, the government has agreed
only to examine new legislative proposals to ensure that, consistent with ARC
guidelines, administrative decisions made under the legislative proposals are
subject to appropriate merits review — which means that those presently existing
are excluded. Yet, it can be presumed that the Taskforce made its
recommendation, primarily, on the basis of a study of existing legislation and
related administrative decisions. In effect, while not making it clear, the
government seems to be rejecting the bulk of the intent of the recommendation.
Recommendations 7.27 and 7.28 are intended to ensure that all regulations are
subject to review every five years, unless otherwise specified and, for those that
‘escape’ the RIS system or whose compliance costs are uncertain, they are to be
subject to a review no later than two years after implementation. Both
recommendations were accepted by the government. However, in what seems
to be recognition by the Taskforce of the cost of such reviews, it recommended
they take place ‘following a screening process’, ‘with the scope of the review
tailored to the nature of the regulation and its perceived performance.’ While
the realism of this recommendation can be appreciated, it does tend to contradict
the intent of the six principles of regulation contained in recommendation 7.1,
with its proposal for rigorous assessment of the need for any regulation, whether
existing or new. Also, what is meant by a ‘screening process’, in recommendation
7.27, regarding the review of regulation that escapes the RIS system or whose
compliance costs were uncertain? Its obvious meaning is that the result of the
screening process will be that some regulation will not be reviewed in the two
year period, presumably because it is performing appropriately and a review is,
thus, not necessary. However, it has to be asked if it is possible to come to such
a judgement merely through a ‘screening’ process. Why is not all regulation
subject to such a screening process, rather than the more costly and
time-consuming RIS process? Also, the lack of any specification as to what
screening actually will involve does leave a great deal of discretion in the hands
of the government of the day to determine the rigour of that process, a loop-hole
that is sure to be taken advantage of by governments when pressing
circumstances arise.
Review programs, harmonisation and regulatory
competition: recommendations 7.24, 7.25
Recommendation 7.24 is that the Council of Australian Governments (COAG),
should consider establishing a series of reviews targeted at areas where there is
significant overlap and/or inconsistency between the Australian Government
and state and territory government regulations. In agreeing to the
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recommendation, the government noted that COAG had already established such
a review program. The COAG program continues the review of all relevant
federal and state legislation with regard to business that was conducted under
the National Competition Agreement in the 1996-2005 period, albeit on a smaller
scale and focused on areas of unnecessary overlap and inconsistency and not
primarily focused on anti-competitive elements. It recognises, if not explicitly,
some of the limitations of some of the legislative reviews conducted under that
agreement, as well as the continuing need to ensure that new, inadequate
regulation is as far as possible, restrained. However, unlike the reviews
considered under the agreement process, where all relevant legislation was
reviewed, the reviews referred to in the COAG agreements will be at the
discretion of each jurisdiction. This will enable governments to be selective in
their choice of legislation for review, perhaps, in some cases, avoiding politically
sensitive, but economically important, legislation. However, the fact that all
Australian state and federal governments have agreed to the principles involved
should enable substantial peer group pressure to be exerted on recalcitrant
governments, in a manner somewhat akin to the OECD’s peer review mechanism
(see OECD 2003, for example).
Recommendation 7.25 — or an overarching institutional framework for the
national harmonisation of regulation — has been accepted by Australian
jurisdictions, noting progress in that regard in the context of COAG. However,
the basic question of harmonisation in a federal system needs some more detailed
consideration than that provided in the report. A requirement to examine ways
of increasing harmonisation within existing regulatory frameworks was part of
the brief given to the Taskforce (pA1 and p28) and several recommendations for
harmonisation were made, both in relation to specific regulatory systems (for
example, medical devices, 4.18, 4.27, consumer health and safety 4.44,
conveyancing laws 4.63, tax 5.45 and in chapter seven, with regard to
Australia-wide harmonisation, particularly recommendation 7.25). While the
author does not dispute the value of appropriate harmonisation, it is of concern
that the benefits of regulatory competition between jurisdictions in a federal
system may be neglected, for a now voluminous literature indicates that
regulatory competition can have substantial benefits. At best, however, the
possible benefits of regulatory competition are referred to only indirectly in the
report and the government’s response, such as with regard to 7.25, where it
notes that failsafe mechanisms should be put in place ‘to ensure that any
jurisdictional variations from national regulations are either legitimated by all
parties or annulled’, which implies that variations that are more efficient can be
legitimated, if credible. However, the general tone of the recommendation and,
indeed, of the Taskforce report, is that regulatory variation is for the most part
unfortunate and unduly costly for business. Competition does have its costs,
such as those imposed by the need to adjust products and services in order to
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satisfy regulatory variation between jurisdictions but, given its well-founded
if not absolute acceptability in promoting economic efficiency, it is surprising
that it did not achieve more attention in the regulatory context. A world of
harmonised regulation is not necessarily efficient.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Taskforce report provides a useful insight into the systems
for making business regulation. However, several of its arguments, especially
those relating to the alleged risk averseness of Australian society, are not
convincing, at least without further refinement and more reliable data. In part,
this may have been caused by the limited time available for such an important
project. It is more convincing when it comes to the assessment of the RIS system
and its recommendations for its strengthening, no doubt drawing upon its chair’s
knowledge and experience in the Productivity Commission. The Government
clearly found the Taskforce’s assessment convincing and accepted the bulk of
its recommendations — most of which constituted improvements to existing
processes and techniques rather than fundamental changes — although these
will be re-interpreted in ways that will not unduly constrain government
prerogative.
As the tenor of the specific comments made in this chapter suggest, a large
proportion of the recommendations made and accepted by the government
represent a plea for more effective support and resourcing for a system that is
already largely in place but that lacks the full extent of political and senior,
administrative commitment and support needed to make it effective. Its positive
reception suggests that commitment and support has now been increased, which
should provide some reassurance to those in the Productivity Commission and
business who have been expressing rising concern over the volume and quality
of regulation. But, any government’s capacity to provide support and
commitment is limited and variable, swinging from issue area to issue area in
line with changing socio-economic realities. The greatest value of the report
might be that it made the pendulum swing in the direction of regulation and its
improvement.
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Chapter 7. Process and
performance-based regulation:




Recent decades have seen a substantial move by regulators in Australia, as in
many — perhaps most — other OECD countries, toward adopting
performance-based and process-based regulation, in preference to traditional
prescriptive regulation. Performance based regulation can be defined as regulation
that specifies required outputs, rather than inputs and thus provides a degree
of freedom to the regulated to determine how they will achieve compliance.
Process-based regulation specifies risk identification, assessment and control
processes that must be undertaken, documented and (usually) audited. It is most
commonly used in contexts in which there are multiple risk sources and multiple
feasible risk controls.
This shift in regulatory styles has occurred in pursuit of more effective and
efficient regulation and has been almost unanimously welcomed, indeed often
vigorously promoted, by regulatory reformers. However, these forms of
regulation have many potential drawbacks which have often been insufficiently
recognised and inadequately taken into account in regulatory design and
implementation. Regulators and regulatory reformers need to act to ensure that
the promise of more effective and efficient regulation through the adoption of
these newer forms is met in practice. This requires development of a more
sophisticated understanding of the nature of these forms of regulation and the
critical success factors for their use. Crucially, it requires a more critical approach
to the question of whether they are suitable to particular regulatory
circumstances: to replace the current tendency to see these regulations as
necessarily more ‘modern’ and superior to prescriptive regulation.
Evidence of the shift
First, it is important to establish the extent of the shift in regulatory styles that
has taken place. I will do this by means of a quick tour of the current Australian
regulatory landscape. However, as some comparisons made along the way will
indicate, in many areas the picture is quite similar in a range of other countries.
In sum, it is fair to say that process and performance-based regulation is
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prominent in all of the major fields in which social regulation exists. That said,
it is important to recognise that these three categories of regulation are not
mutually exclusive and that many regulatory structures are likely to include
elements of two or more regulatory types.
Environmental regulation
Performance based environmental regulation has a history extending over more
than two decades. Performance-based ‘framework standards’ are contained in
quasi-regulatory instruments such as ‘State Environment Protection Policies’.
The works approval process arguably functions as a non-transparent form of
process-based regulation. That is, environmental regulators exercise a substantial
measure of control over the productive processes that emitters of significant
pollutants are able to employ by requiring proposed works that would
significantly change existing processes (or implement new ones) to be assessed
and approved prior to construction. This process has the objective of enabling
a ‘whole of process’ approach to emissions management to be adopted by
effectively requiring company management to take these issues into account in
plant and process design. This process-based element is then supplemented by
the imposition of specific performance-based emissions standards, tailored to
the individual licensee, as part of the licensing process which governs the ongoing
operation of the plant.
Rail safety
Rail safety regulation is nationally harmonised and is largely process-based,
being built around an accreditation process applicable to all rail operators and
infrastructure managers. It requires that a ‘safety management system’ (SMS)
be developed by the operator and assessed and approved by the regulator. The
safety management system is based on the identification and assessment of all
significant risks and the development of mechanisms by which they are to be
controlled. This process is currently being reinforced through the adoption of
new national model rail safety legislation, which is expected to specify in
substantially greater detail the requirements for SMS and related
auditing/approvals arrangements.
Interestingly, this high-level regulatory approach is supplemented in practice
by extensive procedures manuals, developed by all significant operators on the
basis of the internal regulatory controls that were in use in former times of
vertically integrated government-owned rail monopolies. These procedures
manuals continue to be largely prescriptive in nature, although they contain
some important performance-based elements. For example, one such manual
includes a prescriptive requirement that a defined proportion of the brakes on
a train must be operational and a performance standard that it must be able to




This area is characterised by a mix of all three forms of regulation. A major
element of process-based regulation exists, notably through requirements for
all ‘food premises’ to adopt individual Food Safety Programs. At the same time,
product standards set out in the Food Standards Code contain an interesting mix
of performance-based and prescriptive requirements. For example, the standards
relating to cheese contain a prescriptive requirement (milk must be pasteurised
before being used for cheese-making), as well as performance-based requirements
in the form of maximum allowable bacterial loads.
Occupational health and safety
All Australian OHS acts conform to the ‘Robens model’, which is based on the
specification of the most general of performance standards: the duty to provide
a workplace which is safe ‘as far as reasonably practicable’. The acts include
very broadly specified process-based requirements, for example specifying the
‘hierarchy of controls’ that must be adopted in undertaking actions to comply
with the general duty in different circumstances.
Regulations deal with the interpretation of these duties in a range of specific
areas of identified major risk and, in doing so, often adopt a combination of
prescriptive requirements and performance standards. For example, Victorian
asbestos regulations set out a performance-based exposure standard, which is
supplemented by a number of prescriptive requirements, as well as restatements
of the general duties applicable and of the required hierarchy of controls to be
adopted.
Vehicle design standards
Vehicle standards are internationally harmonised to a large degree — although
the USA is a major non-adherent — and based on the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) standards. They are fundamentally
performance-based, although they also include significant prescriptive elements
in some areas. For example, the door latch regulations are based on a performance
standard, requiring that latches be able to withstand a specified pressure but
also include a prescriptive requirement that doors must hinge at the front, unless
the front door is designed to close over a rear hinged back door.
Building regulation
Technical standards in this area are almost completely nationally harmonised.
They are fundamentally performance-based and are supported by ‘functional
statements’ (in common with the vehicle design standards just mentioned) which
clearly state the underlying purpose, or objective, of each of the specific
regulatory requirements. Building regulation includes, as part of the published
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regulatory document, a set of ‘deemed to satisfy’ prescriptive standards aimed
at providing certainty of compliance.
This summarises the position in the major areas of social regulation within
Australia, in terms of the extent to which process and/or performance-based
regulation has been adopted. Of course, the position in Australia is not unique.
As I have suggested, there are substantial formal regulatory harmonisation
processes in place in some areas, such as vehicle design standards, while in
others, such as occupational health and safety, substantially similar regulatory
approaches are the results of less formal co-operation between regulators and
‘demonstration effects’.
More generally, a number of recent OECD publications have documented the
fact that the trend toward increasing use of performance and process-based
regulation is visible in the great majority of its member countries. For example,
the OECD reported in 2002 that approximately half of member countries stated
that they were making increasing use of performance-based regulations in both
environmental and health and safety regulation, while a slightly smaller number
reported increased use of process-based regulation in these areas (OECD 2002).
Support by regulatory reformers
The advice of regulatory reformers to regulators can generally be summarised
as amounting to a fairly uncritical endorsement of the adoption of process and/or
performance-based regulation in a wide range of areas. For example, the main
guideline document on regulation-making issued by the Council of Australian
Governments states:
… unless prescriptive requirements are unavoidable in order to ensure
public safety in high-risk situations, performance-based requirements
that specify outcomes rather than inputs or other prescriptive
requirements should be used (Council of Australian Governments 2004).
Similarly, the Victorian government's Guide to Regulation states that:
Where appropriate and where permitted by the enabling Act, the
Victorian Government encourages the use of performance-based
regulation (Victorian Government 2005).
Guidelines as to when performance-based regulation may be appropriate are
issued pursuant to the Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 (Vic). However, apart
from making the point that the enabling legislation must permit regulation to
be of this type, they say little other than that a benefit/cost approach should be
taken and that regulators should be familiar with the characteristics of the
regulated industry when making this decision.
The New Zealand regulatory guidance document differs in providing a more
balanced view, arguing that:
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Principle and performance-based standards are more appropriate where
the outcome can be measured (to ensure compliance) and where
innovation is likely to be an important consideration … Prescriptive
standards are useful where information costs are high and there is little
scope for innovation (New Zealand Government 1999).
Interestingly, neither of the two Australian regulatory guidance documents
mentioned above makes any reference at all to process-based regulation,
notwithstanding that the quick survey of existing regulatory styles that I have
just given suggests that process-based regulation may now be even more widely
used than is performance-based regulation. The New Zealand guide refers to
‘principle based’ regulation, which it defines as regulations that ‘describe the
objective sought in general terms and require interpretation according to the
circumstance’ (ibid). Legislation, such as the occupational health and safety
(OHS) Acts that specify a range of ‘general duties’, would fall within this
definition.
The relatively uncritical endorsement of these forms of regulation revealed by
these quotes reflects a widespread perception among regulatory reform officials
that regulators are conservative in their approaches to the use of different policy
instruments and largely reliant upon existing approaches. For example, the
OECD has written in this context:
… a crucial challenge for regulatory policies is to encourage cultural
changes within regulatory bodies that will ensure that a comparative
approach is taken systematically to the question of how best to achieve
policy objectives. Efficient and effective policy action is only possible
if all available instruments are considered as means of achieving the
identified objective. The instruments to be considered include a wide
range of non-regulatory instruments, as well as a number of distinctly
different forms of regulation (OECD 2002: 52).
If regulators are seen as having strong conservative biases in their choices of
policy instrument, it is unsurprising that regulatory reformers would see their
main task as being that of promoting relatively new and unfamiliar instruments
with the potential for improved efficiency and effectiveness.
The view of regulators as fundamentally conservative and risk adverse in nature
is probably fairly soundly based when considering the attitudes of regulators
toward replacing regulatory approaches with other, non-regulatory policy
instruments, although, even here, it is possible to argue that the propensity of
regulators to entertain options such as carbon taxes and emissions trading as
responses to global warming is probably greater than that of the politicians that
they serve.
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However, if there is a degree of risk aversion in relation to non-regulatory policy
instruments, the quick tour of current approaches to social regulation I have
given casts considerable doubt on the question of whether regulators can truly
be said to be averse to adopting regulation that departs from the traditional
prescriptive, or ‘command and control’, form.
If regulators are actually quite open to the use of innovative regulatory
instruments, the emphasis of the advice that regulatory reformers are providing
to regulators should, arguably, be shifting away from an uncritical promotion
of the use of process and performance-based regulation and toward the provision
of sophisticated and practical advice regarding both the potential drawbacks of
these styles of regulation and the tools that can be used to minimise or avoid
these potential problems.
Of course, this proposition rests upon a view that substantial negative impacts
can be identified in respect of moves to adopt process and/or performance-based
regulation. Consequently, I would now like to identify and analyse some of these
potential negative impacts, before moving on to a discussion of how they can
be minimised and/or avoided.
Negative impacts and problems — types and evidence
Indiscriminate use
The first of these problems is the increasingly apparent tendency toward the
indiscriminate adoption of process or performance-based regulation. Such a
tendency is, perhaps unsurprising, given the largely uncritical view of these
forms of regulation being promoted in some quarters, including by regulatory
reformers, as I have shown.
The adoption of process-based regulation in inappropriate circumstances is
particularly problematic. This form of regulation is potentially a powerful tool
when the range of risks that need to be controlled is numerous, when some or
even many risks may be poorly understood and when a wide range of possible
controls exists. In such circumstances, it is nearly impossible to specify an optimal
prescriptive approach to regulation and even the use of performance-based
regulation may be problematic if appropriate risk standards cannot readily be
identified and specified.
However, the adoption of process-based regulation, with its emphasis on
management based and systemic controls, is necessarily a relatively
‘heavy-handed’ approach, in the sense that it inevitably implies quite substantial
compliance obligations on affected parties. This suggests that its use should be
reserved for situations in which:
• the size of the identified risks that regulation must address is substantial (or
the consequences of a single failure are catastrophic, e.g. aviation safety);
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• existing regulatory approaches are performing poorly in achieving their
underlying objectives, are unduly costly or otherwise subject to a significant
measure of ‘lack of consent’ on the part of the regulated; and
• the regulated industry generally has sufficient capacities to effectively
implement the management based requirements of process regulation.
By contrast, where the risks to be mitigated are relatively few and the control
measures that can feasibly be employed are also relatively few and well known,
there is little likelihood that the specification of a process-based approach will
perform better than other alternatives. The application of process-based
regulation in these circumstances is likely to lead to strong complaints that the
regulatory requirements amount to a costly and time-consuming ‘paper chase’,
with little being achieved as a result.
Some examples of this problem arising from recent Victorian experience are
instructive. A requirement, adopted in 2001 in the Food Act 1984 (Vic), for all
food premises to adopt a Food Safety Plan effectively applied process regulation
to all corner cafes and the like. This implied a massive paperwork burden in a
context in which risks were few and well defined, as were the appropriate
controls. Small businesses saw the requirement to develop the plans as a massive
compliance burden, given their unfamiliarity with the processes required, as
well as leading to a situation in which they had no certainty that their resulting
plan would be found to be compliant. The resulting outcry effectively forced
the government to develop and propagate ‘template’ food safety plans to act as
guidance for such businesses.
In practice, it seems that little customisation of these templates occurred. The
fact that template food safety programs could be developed effectively constitutes
an admission of the inappropriateness of applying process-based regulation in
this context, as it showed that broadly applicable risk controls could be identified
and specified in a quasi-regulatory document. However, this did not prevent
the proposal of similar requirements for all dentists across Victoria, covering the
use of x-ray machines. These requirements would have been implemented under
the Radiation Act 2007 (Vic). Here again, small dental practices would be required
to undertake the whole risk identification, assessment and control process when,
in fact, the requirements of their registration as dentists already included elements
of regulation of the use of x-ray machines.
In the event, recently implemented requirements for regulatory impact assessment
to be conducted on draft legislation identified the disproportionate costs involved
and convinced the regulators to drop the proposal. However, without such
controls, it is highly likely that the developing ‘orthodoxy’ among regulators
in favour of process-based regulation would have led to its use in this obviously
inappropriate context.
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These are examples of areas in which the basic rationale for process-based
regulation, that is, that there are multiple sources of risk and multiple potential
means of addressing those risks, are not met. However, in some other
circumstances in which these ‘threshold’ conditions are met, substantial problems
have still arisen due to the process-based regulatory requirements being applied
across too broad a scope.
The food safety case I have just cited is also an example of this dynamic. Another
example is the recent adoption of new rail safety legislation in Victoria. While
rail operations clearly do constitute an appropriate context in which to implement
process-based regulation, the scope of the legislation and specifically its
requirements for accreditation and the preparation of detailed Safety Management
Systems, was broadened to the point where tourism and heritage sector operators
were also required to conform to these requirements. Thus, organisations running
very small scale rail operations and relying largely or wholly on volunteer labour
are being asked to undertake the whole risk identification and assessment process,
document the findings, submit them for regulatory approval and have them
audited on a regular basis. While there was some debate as to whether these
operators might be excluded, it appears that the decision to expand the scope
of process-based regulation to include this group was essentially a political one.
In the event, the political solution to the problem generated by the poor decision
on regulatory scope is that government will subsidise the sector to complete the
regulatory obligations that have been imposed upon it. This surely constitutes
recognition that the public would not willingly accept that the necessary
consequence of expanding the regulatory reach of the new requirements into
these areas would otherwise be the closure of substantial parts of the tourism
and heritage rail sector.
Negative combinations of process, performance &
prescriptive regulations
A second set of problems relates to the frequent failure of regulators to produce
logical, mutually supportive combinations of process, performance and/or
prescriptive regulation. Certainly, many or even most regulatory structures need
to combine at least two of these types of regulation in order to achieve an efficient
and effective whole. However, there seems to be little understanding of how
these combinations ought to be achieved. Again, a couple of examples can
highlight the problem.
The first relates to the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code and specifically
the part of it that deals with cheese-making. This part constitutes a wholly
dysfunctional combination of prescriptive and performance-based regulation,
as was made apparent in an Administrative Appeals Tribunal hearing in 2003.1
The prescriptive requirement is that milk used to make cheese must be
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pasteurised. The performance standard specifies the maximum allowable bacterial
load. As cheese is defined as a high-risk product, a certain proportion of cheeses
must be tested on importation and the bacterial load shown to be below the
performance standard. The AAT hearing arose because an importer of cheese
made from unpasteurised milk wished to have it tested and approved for sale
on the basis that it met the performance standard. AQIS argued that it was not
required to test the cheese until he could show that the cheese had met the
prescriptive standard. The AAT upheld the AQIS viewpoint, based on its reading
of the letter of the code, notwithstanding that AQIS did not make any claim that
the cheese in question was unsafe for human consumption. Despite this
demonstrated absurdity, the code has not been amended and the cheese in
question is on sale now in Australia only because it went through an expensive
and time consuming ‘exemption’ process which must audit the entire
cheese-making process in order to prove that it will systematically lead to the
production of ‘safe’ cheese.
A second type of dysfunctional combination of performance and prescriptive
standards relates to the widespread use of Deemed to Satisfy (DTS) standards.
These are generally prescriptive standards drafted in order to provide guidance
on means of compliance, particularly for small business and therefore to improve
the certainty of compliance with performance-based regulation. Their use, in
many circumstances, is an almost inevitable adjunct to the adoption of
performance-based regulation.
However, two problems can be identified. First, most of Australia's occupational
health and safety legislation arguably makes this material ‘quasi-compulsory’
by reversing the onus of proof, such that employers who do not use the DTS
material must, in the event of a prosecution, prove that they achieved ‘an
equivalent level of safety’2  by alternative means. Thus, the performance-based
legislation is effectively supplemented by a substantial body of detailed,
prescriptive quasi-legislation.
Second, even where this issue of a reversal of the onus of proof is not relevant,
the adoption of large quantities of DTS material will still tend, in many
circumstances, to lead to a ‘reading up’ of the compliance obligations established
in the performance-based regulation. This problem may be exacerbated by the
fact that there is often relatively little attention paid to the drafting quality of
the DTS material, as it is seen as having guidance status rather than constituting
regulation. Thus, while a high proportion of businesses may use the DTS material
as the basis for their regulatory compliance efforts, it’s technical quality may be
substantially less than that of the prescriptive regulation that it has, in many
cases, replaced. This is particularly the case where large numbers of technical
standards are adopted in the DTS material, as this kind of material is not generally
drafted with legislative compliance issues in mind.
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To take just one example, a quick search of the NSW Occupational Health and
Safety Regulation 2001 reveals that it calls up 30 Australian Standards and five
National Occupational Health and Safety Commission standards. This
demonstrates a third area of concern: while performance-based regulation has
often been promoted, in part, because it supposedly simplifies regulatory
requirements (by replacing detailed prescriptive requirements with simple
outcome standards) the result is very often the reverse. The total volume of the
technical standards one must read and digest in order to reach a clear
understanding of the regulatory meaning may be many times larger than the
previous body of prescriptive regulation.
Thus, while the supplementation of performance-based standards with DTS
material is probably virtually inevitable, in most regulatory contexts, there is a
strong danger that excessive use of this mechanism will effectively contribute
to significant increases in regulatory complexity and cost, particularly because
of the relative absence of regulatory quality controls on such ‘grey letter’ law.
I should note that this issue of the overuse of technical standards has been
recognised for some years now, with some regulatory guidance material advising
a sceptical approach (or at least a careful one) should be taken to their adoption
in regulation. However, as a recent Productivity Commission report suggests,
with around 2300 Australian Standards (one third of the total) alone now being
incorporated ‘by reference’ in Australian law, there seems to have been little
progress made (Productivity Commission 2006: xiv).
Lack of clearly defined compliance requirements
Process and performance-based legislation also often suffers from an absence of
clearly identified standards as to compliance obligations. This issue was
highlighted in the recent Maxwell Report, which reviewed the Victorian
occupational health and safety legislation that had been in place since the
mid-1980s (Maxwell 2004). Maxwell made recommendations intended to deal
with this issue. However, their implementation by government appears to have
had a perverse outcome.
The core issue is that the general duty on employers has historically been to
provide ‘as far as is reasonably practicable’ a safe workplace. This is an example
of what in New Zealand is referred to as ‘principles based’ regulation. Maxwell
recommended that the legislation should explicitly state that this standard
involves a requirement to take action to reduce risk up to the point at which
the costs of the risk reduction activity became ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the
benefit obtained from the risk reduction (Maxwell 2004: 125-34).
This test is itself clearly open to some interpretation. However, Maxwell explicitly
contrasted this test with the benefit/cost framework that is statutorily required
to be used in Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) and which, for an economist
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is consistent with societal welfare maximisation. Maxwell makes clear that the
‘gross disproportion’ test would require that actions be taken with costs that
significantly exceed benefits in many cases. However, he fails to discuss or
resolve the conflict inherent in his proposing primary legislation that sets an
entirely different test of employer duties from that to which any subordinate
legislation made under its authority must be subjected.
Interestingly, it has not taken long for other regulators to recognise this problem.
This has led to be adoption in the new Rail Safety Act 2006 (Vic) of an alternative
form of words: the duty of rail organisations is to control risk ‘So Far As Is
Reasonably Practicable’. According to the regulators involved, it was intended
that the ‘gross disproportion’ test would not apply, as it was considered
impractical and unduly onerous to apply this standard to the industry.
However, while this is the intent behind establishing alternative wording for
the relevant test, it remains far from clear that it has been achieved and will
presumably await the development of case law for this question to be determined.
RIA problems
A very significant problem with performance-based and, especially, process-based
legislation is that it can become almost impossible to undertake reasonable ex
ante RIA on regulation that is framed in these terms. In particular, there is little
prospect of developing robust ex ante analyses of requirements to develop SMS
and to develop risk controls based upon those SMS. This problem is particularly
acute when legislation gives little explicit detail as to the required content of
SMS and relies overly on the discretion of regulators in this regard. In this
context, there must be substantial uncertainty as to whether regulation of this
sort will produce net benefits for society, while the legitimacy of the RIA process
is also undermined as a result.
This problem is compounded by the fact that the spur for the adoption of
process-based regulation in a particular circumstance is often not any clearly
identified and measured problems with the outcomes achieved under existing
regulation but, rather, a desire to adopt ‘best practice’ regulation — with
process-based regulation increasingly being seen in this light regardless of the
specific regulatory circumstance. Thus — and I say this from the viewpoint of
a consultant who undertakes a great deal of RIA — there can be major challenges
at both the ‘problem identification’ stage and in terms of developing the argument
that process-based regulation is likely to lead to superior regulatory performance
than existing arrangements: there is often no identifiable regulatory failure when
outcomes are considered, yet very substantial new compliance obligations are
being proposed. As an example, new rail safety legislation in Victoria has been
estimated to impose over $20 million in additional regulatory costs over 10 years
and is being imposed in a context in which the incidence of rail fatalities has
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shown a continuing declining trend over more than two decades and, considered
in an international context, is already running at levels well below OECD
averages.
Equity and accountability issues
Process-based regulation, in particular, often lacks legitimacy with the public
and, in some cases, with regulated entities owing to concerns that it does not
necessarily ensure equal, or equitable, treatment for different regulated entities.
This concern arises from the degree of discretion, or judgment required to be
exercised by the regulatory agency in assessing compliance with, for example,
an SMS requirement. Arguably, this issue largely constitutes a specific case of
the general issue of regulatory transparency: that is, that many of these concerns
can be addressed by regulators being more open about the criteria used for
judgment, such as by publishing guidance material on relevant issues.
Finally, a long-standing concern with the use of performance standards, which
is also relevant to process-based regulation, relates to the availability of various
‘incorporated texts’. As I have already suggested, performance-based regulation
often leans heavily on supplementary material that is prescriptive in nature and
which often has deemed-to-comply status but may also be compulsory. The use
of Australian Standards in this context is particularly widespread. The key issue
here is that these standards must be purchased at substantial cost and frequently
updated. By contrast, legislation has traditionally been published at minimal
cost, while there is an increasing expectation that legislation will be available
online at no charge.
Some possible solutions
In raising all of these problems and concerns, I certainly do not mean to suggest
that the use of either process-based or performance-based regulation is, on
balance, a negative for regulatory quality. Rather, I want to highlight the need
for a better understanding of the nature of these regulatory tools and, in
particular, of the specific regulatory contexts in which their use is being
considered. Also needed is more careful regulatory design and development that
takes account of this context. The following highlights major issues in ensuring
this is achieved.
Ensure adequate understanding of the regulatory context
This implies one must:
• understand the nature of the risks being regulated and the possible solutions
before determining what form of regulation is preferred;
• only use process-based approaches where there are multiple risk sources and
multiple possible risk controls; and
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• only use performance-based regulation when it is possible to specify clearly
the required outcome standards and, again, where there are likely to be
different ways of achieving them and/or innovation is likely to be an
important factor.
Understand the regulated industry
When considering process or performance-based regulation, consider the
capacities of regulated parties: will it be feasible and proportionate to ask them
to undertake the required compliance processes?
If process-based regulation appears appropriate, consider how small business
compliance issues will be dealt with.
Appropriate use of DTS material
When developing DTS standards, consider the overall volume of regulatory and
quasi-regulatory material and assess this against the question of feasibility of
regulatory compliance.
In this context, remember that regulation should set a framework for compliance
efforts, not attempt to set out a prescriptive requirement for all conceivable
circumstances.
When adopting existing materials as DTS standards, consider whether they are
drafted in ways that are appropriate for interpretation in a regulatory context.
If not, consider the need to draft new materials specifically for this purpose.
Combining regulatory forms
Consider the relationships between prescriptive, performance and/or
process-based regulatory elements, ensuring that they are mutually supportive
rather than antagonistic. For example, setting out prescriptive regulatory
requirements but providing for exemptions to be provided where process-based
alternative approaches are adopted is likely to be an effective combination.
Setting out both a prescriptive and a performance-based standard and requiring
both to be met (rather than either) is not likely to be effective.
Role of regulatory policy/regulatory reform bodies
Responsibility for making more sophisticated and effective choices among
regulatory alternatives obviously rests primarily with regulators. However,
regulatory reformers have a potentially major role to play — these issues are at
the core of what the OECD calls ‘regulatory policy’.
As a first step, regulatory policy must abandon the almost uncritical promotion
of these forms of regulation in favour of a more sophisticated message. A major
element of this would be developing more sophisticated regulatory guidance
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material that looks at issues of linking regulatory context and regulatory design
and goes into some detail on aspects of regulatory design.
Enhanced controls as part of regulatory policy
The provision of improved advice and guidance on the use regulation should
also be accompanied by the adoption of a ‘challenge’ function as one of the
responsibilities of regulatory reform authorities. This challenge model already
exists in some jurisdictions including, to a degree, the Australian Federal
government. The issue here is necessarily broader than the question of the use
of performance or process-based regulation. However, providing regulatory
reform authorities with the power, or responsibility, to act positively to challenge
what they believe to be poor regulatory practices could be particularly important
improving the way that these forms of regulation are being used.
Finally, I suspect that this is an area in which regulatory reform authorities may
themselves frequently have limited expertise and understanding. This suggests
the need for significant development activity, both through research of the
relevant literature and, potentially, through working cooperatively with
regulators in the development and implementation of practical models combining
different regulatory types.
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As noted, the bulk of the chapters in this book other than the introduction and
this conclusion were presented originally as separate conference papers on a
related theme. Hence, while each of the papers addresses an aspect of the second
or third waves of regulatory reform that have taken place in Australia since the
mid-1980s, focused on reforms to processes, they were not designed to fit together
in a coherent whole as chapters in a book. Moreover, the papers were presented
before COAG had reached any final agreement on the National Reform Agenda
(NRA) — the third wave of reform. Nevertheless, as we hope the reader will
agree, they do provide a valuable set of perspectives about the various processes
of regulatory reform as a whole, as well as important, specific issues that have
arisen. In this context three broad conclusions reached in the chapters are
identified and, as far as possible, related to the final COAG agreement on the
NRA.
The first is that while the reforms have improved the quality of the processes
associated with the making of regulation, the level of improvement has been
variable in both extent and impact. The second is that reform should continue,
as has been agreed by COAG, in terms of both building on the established
achievements as well as remedying the reforms that have been less successful.
The third is that the primary focus of regulatory reform in Australia, at least at
the federal level, has focused on regulatory simplification and efficiency, rather
neglecting the issue of how to manage regulatory complexity.
With regard to the first conclusion, the main vehicle of process reform has been
the RIS system, though with variable results. Perhaps the fundamental and
inevitable difficulty its proponents face is that policy-making is an inherently
political process — one that is embedded in a liberal-democratic system of
government. This is a difficulty — perhaps an insurmountable one — as the
wishes of the electorate do not always coincide with the requirements of a rational
decision-making process such as that at the core of the RIS process. Rather,
politics involves constantly changing activities and processes arising from the
interaction of individual and group values, motivations and actions, notably in
situations of scarce human and physical resources. Both conflict and cooperation
can result and, while conflict is not an inevitable result of such interactions, it
is a very frequent characteristic, especially where individuals and groups
compete, successfully and unsuccessfully, for the scarce resources they see as
necessary to achieve their goals or where they compete in relation to values (or
both). It often requires a series of compromises between the competing parties
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before agreement can be reached as to the content of a new or modified
regulation.
When the set of compromises that constitute a regulation are subject to rational
analysis in terms of the more rigorous criteria utilised in a cost-benefit analysis,
they are likely to ‘fail’ to meet the criteria or tests mandated under RIS. But RIS
does not test for the merits of the compromises underlying the regulation. It is
silent as to whether a regulation meets the criteria for political success. Hence,
it is not surprising that ministers, their minders and senior public servants have
reservations about the value of RIS, reservations that are visible in their varying
degrees of commitment to the process. However, it is important that all of these
actors, as well as the constituencies they represent, are made aware of the costs
and the benefits of the compromises they have reached. In a very real sense, a
good RIS — one that includes a rigorous financial analysis or cost-benefit analysis
— indicates the cost of politics for a democratic system: costs that should always
be born in mind by decision-makers.
While not explicit, elements of the above view about the constraints imposed
upon rational decision-making by the political system are contained within
COAG’s 2007 Communiqué regarding the NRA (COAG 2007). This is most obvious
in relation to two areas: one, the requirement for a new system of annual reviews
where each government conducts annual, targeted reviews; and two, an
agreement for an intergovernmental, benchmarking study of the compliance
costs of regulation (COAG 2007: 9-10).
The annual reviews of selected regulation are to involve a public inquiry and
reporting process that provides opportunities for input from a range of
stakeholders, with the review recommendations to be acted upon by each
government (COAG 2007: 9). While this will not avoid the inevitable politics
associated with the making of regulation, it will, if successful, help ensure that
the compromises, costs and benefits of significant regulatory decisions as
embodied in the selected regulation, will be reviewed in a public context and
on a regular basis. The result, hopefully, will be regulatory compromises that
impose least costs on the community, if not perfectly rational regulation.
The benchmarking proposal will have a salutary impact on the politics of
regulation as it will make public the relative costs of the compromises embodied
in comparable regulation in each of the member governments, notably the state
governments. In particular, the comparative costs to business of complying with
regulation will be made available. While the impact of such knowledge is
uncertain, it is not difficult to imagine a number of scenarios. One might be the
‘regulatory competition’ scenario. In this scenario ‘benchmarking data’ will lead
to a demand from business for new or modified regulations that impose either
no greater cost, or less cost, than the comparable regulations in the other
jurisdictions, as shown by the bench mark studies. While the specifics of business
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demands will vary, firms and their industry associations will tend to put forward
the argument that they are, or will be disadvantaged by competition from
products or services produced in the other jurisdictions where the cost of
regulation is less.
If we assume that the demands of business for the lower cost regulation are
accepted, then the governments involved have a number of options. At the
simplest level this might involve little more than a simple copying of regulation
from the ‘least cost’ state, perhaps for a decrease in the fees charged to business.
However, at times more substantial policy innovation will be necessary in
designing new and less cost regulation, imposing greater workloads on the policy
developers involved. If local policy design capacity is limited, or an existing
regulatory design seems most efficient, then there is likely to be an increase in
the policy transfer of less costly regulation from the states with less costly
regulatory regimes to the states with more costly regimes. Policy innovation by
means of policy transfer — or copying from other states — is already
commonplace, but benchmarking may increase its frequency, given the need
for rapid policy responses in a competitive regulatory environment. It might
also lead to a greater role for COAG in determining whether or not a regulation
should be harmonised across all member governments.
Indeed, there are dangers in this regard as the costs of developing the necessary
innovative regulatory capacity might be seen as too great at the state government
level, leading to a tendency to encourage and support a system for harmonising
regulation that draws less heavily upon their limited resources. This might be
an appropriate response where the regulation that is harmonised is the most
effective, least-cost option. However, those who support the value of competitive
markets would point out that a system of ‘managed’ harmonised regulation that
lacks the stimulus of competition is not likely to be the most efficient or effective.
Rather, it would tend to exhibit the costly features of a cartel-type arrangement.
A final decision on the benchmarking exercise will not be made by COAG until
after the results of the Productivity Commission studies are known. However,
assuming that the results are convincing, the benchmarking of the regulatory
costs of similar regulation in place in each jurisdiction might stimulate the
production of more effective and efficient regulation — provided that it does
not lead to the cartel-like situation noted above.
The second conclusion — that reforms to regulatory processes and associated
techniques should continue, building on its successes, as well as remedying its
failures — is one that was endorsed by COAG in the context of the National
Reform Agenda (NRA). It is evident, for example, in the agreements for annual
reviews and regulatory benchmarking. In addition, it can be seen in the
agreements that all members would:
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… establish and maintain effective arrangements at each level of
government that maximise the efficiency of new and amended regulation
and avoid unnecessary compliance costs and restrictions on competition
by:
(a) establishing and maintaining ‘gate keeping mechanisms’ as part of
the decision-making process to ensure that the regulatory impact of
proposed regulatory instruments are made fully transparent to
decision-makers in advance of decisions being made and to the public
as soon as possible;
(b) improving the quality of regulation impact analysis through the use,
where appropriate, of cost-benefit analysis; better measurement of
compliance costs flowing from new and amended regulation, such as
through the use of the Commonwealth Office of Small Business’ costing
model;
(c) broadening the scope of regulation impact analysis, where appropriate,
to recognise the effect of regulation on individuals and the cumulative
burden on business and, as part of the consideration of alternatives to
new regulation, have regard to whether the existing regulatory regimes
of other jurisdictions might offer a viable alternative; and
(d) applying these arrangements to Ministerial Councils (COAG 2007).
While the specific means by which each jurisdiction is to achieve the above aims
is not specified, each member has provided a progress report against an
‘Intergovernmental Action Plan’, on the actions it has taken — or plans to take
— to implement the aims (COAG 2006; and 2007: 15-22). Their reports indicate
substantial variation in their interpretation of the meaning of the agreements as
well as some variation in their progress in implementation. With regard to the
latter, most governments indicated that the agreed changes to process and
techniques have, or would be put in place in 2007, with the exception of
Tasmania (which provided no indication of expected completion dates).
With regard to variations in interpretation, the Commonwealth government, for
example, has adopted a very ‘hard line’ as regards the adoption of gate-keeping
mechanisms by requiring that its Cabinet Secretariat not circulate final
submissions or memoranda to cabinet members without an adequate RIS or
compliance cost assessment other than in ‘exceptional circumstances’ (COAG
2007: 15). Judgements about the adequacy of RISs are to be made by the
Productivity Commission’s Office of Best Practice Regulation. In contrast, the
NSW Government, in relation to gate-keeping requirements, will require an
assessment of adequacy by a new Better Regulation Office and a certification of
adequacy by a minister with specific responsibility for regulatory reform (COAG
2007:17-18). It makes no mention as to whether or not regulatory proposals that
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are judged ‘not adequate’ or ‘not certified’ will be submitted to cabinet for
consideration. In further contrast, the WA Government’s report notes only that
‘enhanced gate keeping arrangements’ will be put in place, without indicating
what will be the case if submissions are not adequate or complete (COAG 2007:
21). The key question to be asked is whether or not the combination of progress
reports and peer pressure will result in significant progress in the improvement
of regulatory processes in all jurisdictions. This is a question that cannot be
answered, in all fairness, until more time has elapsed.
The third conclusion, that the capacity of Australian governments to manage
regulatory complexity needs to be improved, has not been directly addressed
by COAG in the NRA. Rather, its general goal with regard to regulation is to
reduce what is seen as the regulatory burden on business imposed by the three
levels of government (COAG 2006). It could be argued (although COAG’s reports
do not do so) that: one, the NRA’s general goal of improving regulatory
performance does include an implied commitment to improving the governments’
capacity to manage regulatory complexity, a complexity that will continue even
where the regulatory burden is reduced and simplified; two, that this is the
primary responsibility of the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC).
However, a detailed examination of the COAG agreements reveals no recognition
of the need to improve the management of regulatory complexity, nor any
reference to any related role of the APSC in pursuing such improvements. Instead,
there is only a continuing emphasis on regulation-making and review, but not
day to day management. Similarly, a perusal of two recent, major APSC
documents, the ‘Building Better Governance’, guidelines, and the ‘Tackling
Wicked Problems’ report, both released in 2007, make no reference to the
National Reform Agenda, the role of COAG in that regard, or how the guidelines
might support the achievement of the improved management of regulatory
complexity (APSC 2007a: 2007b).
In 2007 a new Australian Labor Party government under Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd came into office. It is committed to a continuing program of regulatory
reform, including those put forward by the Taskforce on Regulation in 2006,
arguing that the Howard governments had failed to continue the microeconomic
reform process instigated by Labor governments in the 1980s and 1990s, with
the result that the regulatory burden had grown and Australian productivity
had fallen (Emerson 2007). In relation to regulatory processes three significant
changes were introduced by the new Government in late 2007 that signified its
reform commitments: one, the renaming of the existing core Department of
Finance and Administration as the Department of Finance and Deregulation
(DFD); two, the transfer of responsibility for regulatory reform from Treasury
to the DFD; three, the relocation of the Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR)
from the Productivity Commission to DFD, within its Financial Management
Division, with a new Minister Assisting the Finance Minister on Deregulation,
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Dr Craig Emerson. In essence, the three changes constituted a centralisation
within one organisational location of the previously separate areas largely
responsible for regulatory reform in the Commonwealth administration.
Moreover, the DFD, with its long tradition of rigorous assessment of the budgets
and financial management practices of the line departments, was in a position
to add both experience and increased competence to the scrutiny of departmental
RIAs. The decision to use the term ‘deregulation’, in the department’s title is
significant, implying a commitment to cut what many see as the increasing
regulatory burden on business, not merely to engage in regulatory reform. It
sends a clear and very sympathetic signal to the peak business associations and
the Productivity Commission that had been arguing for more effort in this regard,
although the extent to which deregulation actually occurs remains to be seen.
In conclusion, the last three decades have seen repeated attempts to improve
Australia’s regulatory processes and systems based on the assumption that better
regulatory outputs and outcomes can best be achieved by improving the capacity
and design of the systems for making and modifying regulation. Those attempts
have had varying degrees of success and, while the most recent, third wave of
reform is the most ambitious in its scope, committing all COAG members to a
wide range of activities aimed at further improvement, its outcome is likely,
again, to be variable, although the new Rudd government is clearly committed
to those reforms.
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